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After the bursting of the housing bubble and the Great Recession
that followed, there has been an increasing focus on improving market
transparency and recognizing other potential bubbles. The higher edu-
cation and student loan markets are under new levels of scrutiny because
they display many of the hallmarks of a bubble. The American govern-
ment's model of freely extending federal loans to students, while improv-
ing lower- and middle-class access to higher education, has enabled the
formation of detrimental distortions in the higher education market. At
the same time, the soaring cost of higher education has saddled a gener-
ation of young Americans with unmanageable student loan debt. Evi-
dence is beginning to mount that, for too many, their debt-financed
higher education represents a stifling encumbrance instead of the great
investment that society's collective commonsense has long suggested.
This Article explores the factors that contribute to the distortions in
the higher education market, including (1) the informational asymme-
tries that exist between the various parties to a typical debt-financed
purchase of an education, (2) accreditation rules, (3) the peculiar incen-
tives of school faculties, and (4) widely followed school rankings. Due to
nuances between different segments of the higher education market, this
Article focuses on one segment for the sake of brevity: law schools.
However, the analysis and prescription have more general applicabil-
ity to all segments of the higher education market.
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After analyzing the causes, this Article draws on enterprise liability
theory to propose a derivatives-based approach to stemming the run-
away educational costs and improving the value proposition for Ameri-
can students. Specifically, this Article asserts that borrower put rights
should be embedded into new student loan contracts. Such put rights
could provide any student borrower the right, after a pre-set period of
time following graduation, to obtain forgiveness of a portion of her stu-
dent debt provided that certain objective criteria are satisfied. These
criteria would center on whether, and to what extent, a particular stu-
dent borrower's aggregate post-graduation income fails to meet or ex-
ceed pre-determined benchmarks. The risk and cost of this student
borrower put right would be borne primarily by those who, under the
current higher education financing model, bear remarkably little of the
risk and yet reap the bulk of the benefits of government-backed student
loans: schools and lenders. By placing some of the risk of noneconomic
student outcomes on the schools and lenders, diligence will be en-
couraged at a loan's inception, and a school's cost increases could only
be rationalized if they were likely to return commensurate value to the
school's students.
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"In the simple world of consumer sovereignty the consumer rules
and all else flows from that. Every aspect of the firm can be traced back
to how it serves the consumer's interest. But once we move away from
that world to one in which private parties use the state to enforce cartels
all becomes convoluted and confusing."1
- Professor Lloyd Cohen
INTRODUCTION
The recent economic crisis has illuminated major weaknesses in the
financing of higher education in the United States. As many college and
university graduates struggle to manage onerous student loan payments
in the face of the Great Recession,2 commentators have focused their
attention on the questionable value propositions offered by various
American educational programs and institutions. 3 Runaway tuitions and
the burdensome student debt required for most Americans to obtain a
I Lloyd Cohen, Comments on the Legal Education Cartel, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUEs 25, 48 (2008).
2 For an entertaining exegesis of this term, see Catherine Rampell, 'Great Recession': A
Brief Etymology, N.Y. TiMEs EcONOMIx BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-etymology/.
3 See, e.g., Michael Barone, The Higher Education Bubble: Ready to Burst?, RASMUS-
SEN REP. (Sept. 6., 2010), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/publicscontent/politicalcom-
mentary/commentary-by-michael-barone/the-highereducationbubblereadyto-burst
("The people running America's colleges and universities have long thought they were exempt
from the laws of supply and demand and unaffected by the business cycle. Turns out that's
wrong."); Mary Beth Marklein, Grads Taking Law Schools to Task for Poor Job Market, USA
TODAY (Aug. 24, 2010, 1:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2010-08-24-
lAlawschool24_STN.htm; Matt Straquadine, Options for Managing Law School Student
Loan Debt, LAW.COM, (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202434253199
(noting that the average law student who graduated from a private university in 2008 borrowed
more than $91,500 toward that degree, and observing that this debt burden and a shrinking job
market offer a "surefire recipe for postgrad financial fright").
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post-secondary degree are under scrutiny like never before.4 Evidence is
beginning to mount that, for too many students, debt-financed education
represents a stifling encumbrance instead of the great investment that
society's collective commonsense has long advanced.5 Such a finding is
unsurprising in light of the fact that, for too long, the value of education
has been reflexively embraced without adequate examination of its cost.6
Federal programs designed to either subsidize private loans or pro-
vide direct government-funded loans have achieved their noble goal of
making higher education more attainable for students from middle- and
4 See, e.g., Karen Sloan, Going to Law School? Proceed with Caution, LAW.COM (Dec.
14, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202436311250 [hereinafter Sloan, Proceed
with Caution] (suggesting that "would-be lawyers should take a hard look at the benefits and
drawbacks of spending three years and upward of $100,000 to get a law degree . . . ."); Mark
C. Taylor, Academic Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at WKl0 (arguing that with the
cost of a degree "well into the hundreds of thousands of dollars," the argument of school as a
promising investment "is no longer persuasive").
5 See, e.g., Mary Pilon, What's a Degree Really Worth?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2010, at
D6, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487038224045750190828199
66538.html (describing how one researcher estimated that the actual lifetime-earnings gap be-
tween college and high school graduates is just $279,893 and observing that "like any invest-
ment" the benefits of higher education come with risks, such as graduating in a recession);
Herwig Schlunk, Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow up To Be ... Lawyers 1 (Vanderbilt
Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 09-29, 2009), available at http://papers.
ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1497044 (attempting to understand the law degree as an
investment in the "hope to spur future generations of potential law school attendees to think
about the question rationally"). See also Kevin Carey, That Old College Lie, DEMOCRACY 9
(Winter 2010), available at http://www.democracyjoumal.org/that-old-collegelie.html ("For
the average student, college isn't nearly as good a deal as colleges would have us believe.");
James McCusker, College's Problem: Cost, Not Dropouts, HERAL.DNET (Jan 10, 2010), http://
www.heraldnet.com/article/20100110/BIZ/701109897 ("The costs of higher education con-
tinue to rise uncontrollably and borrowing to meet that cost makes little sense for most peo-
ple."); Jennifer Millman, College Grad Can't Find Job, Wants $$$ Back, NBC N.Y. (Aug. 3,
2009, 1:29 PM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local-beat/College-Grad-Cant-Find-Job-
Wants-Back-52304162.html (describing the lawsuit of a recent college graduate suing her
college because she failed to secure "solid employment" following her graduation). Cf Jac-
ques Steinberg, Plan B: Skip College, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2010, at WK1 (noting that "[t]he
idea that four years of higher education will translate into a better job, higher earnings and a
happier life . . . has been pounded into the heads of schoolchildren, parents and educators.");
Kate Zernike, Making College 'Relevant,' N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 2009, at EDI6 (describing
how one college advertises itself as "Home of the Guaranteed Job!" and offers free classes and
temporary payment of student loans for students who fail to find employment in their chosen
fields).
6 One study, for example, observes "economic returns make financing a college educa-
tion a good investment." SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, EDUCATION PAYS: THE BENEFITS OF
HIGHER EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SoCIETY 8 (2007), available at http://www.col-
legeboard.conprod-downloads/about/news-info/cbsenior/yr2007/ed-pays-2007.pdf. In its
analysis, the study offers forty-two charts and illustrations summarizing the effect of educa-
tion's benefits on everything from earnings power to voting and smoking patterns. However,
only one of these charts examines the benefits netted against the costs of the educational
experience.
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lower-income families.7  The abundance of free-flowing funding for
post-secondary education over the past several decades has attracted
many to the academy.8 At the same time, much as it propelled the hous-
ing boom,9 government efforts at "access" have spurred a dramatic in-
crease in the cost of education.10 The cost of attending law school, for
7 See Bridget Terry Long, Do Loans Increase College Access and Choice? Examining
the Introduction of Universal Student Loans 1 (New England Pub. Policy Ctr., Working Paper
No. 07-1, 2007) (outlining the efforts of the federal government "to increase college access,
choice and affordability"). See also Daniel J. Morrissey, Saving Legal Education, 56 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 254, 269 (2006) (conceding that the ability to borrow the large sums of money neces-
sary to finance a legal education "has made it possible for the vast majority of .. . applicants to
attend law school").
8 According to the ABA, the 2008-2009 academic year set records for first-year enroll-
ment (49,414), total J.D. enrollment (142,922), and total law school enrollment (152,033). See
Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963-2008, AM. BAR Ass'N 1 (2009), available at http://
www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/stats%20-%201.pdf.
9 See, e.g., ANDREW GILLEN, A TUITION BUBBLE? LESSONS FROM THE HOUSING BUBBLE
8 (2008), available at http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/BubbleReport
Final.pdf (discussing the similarities between the housing market and student loans and ob-
serving that the "sustained and widespread increases in tuition indicate that they are, like the
rise in housing prices, a rational response to the circumstances faced by market participants");
Barone, supra note 3 ("Government-subsidized loans have injected money into higher educa-
tion, as they did into housing, causing prices to balloon."); Ron Lieber, Placing the Blame as
Students Are Buried in Debt, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, at B I (characterizing the student debt
burden of tens of thousands as "an eerie echo of the mortgage crisis"). See also Steve Eisman,
Subprime Goes to College, Speech at Ira Sohn Conference, slide 29 (May 26, 2010), presenta-
tion reposted on SCRIBD, http://www.scribd.com/doc/32066986/Steve-Eisman-Ira-Sohn-Con
ference-May-2010 (last visited Sept. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Eisman, Subprime Goes to College];
Christine Hurt, Bubbles, Student Loans and Sub-Prime Debt, CONGLOMERATE BLOG (Apr. 19,
2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/04/death-of-big-law-forum-bubbles-student-
loans-and-subprime-debt.html (briefly examining the comparison between the sub-prime mar-
ket and the law student loan market).
10 See, e.g., The Rising Cost of College Tuition and the Effectiveness of Government
Financial Aid: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 113 (2000)
(testimony of David W. Breneman, Ph.D., Dean, Curry School of Education, University of
Virginia) ("Most federal loan programs are capped, but with the addition of numerous private
loan programs, plus home equity loans, it seems plausible to me that the availability of loan
finance has made it easier for some institutions to raise prices."); BRIDGET TERRY LONG, DANA
ANSEL & GREG LEISERSON, PAYING FOR COLLEGE: THE RISING COST OF HIGHER EDUCATION,
MASS. INST. FOR A NEW COMMONWEALTH 80 (2006) (observing that "[p]art of the reason
college prices have increased is due to the increasing use of financial aid by institutions");
Taylor, Academic Bankruptcy, supra note 4 ("Students and their parents are carrying unsus-
tainable levels of debt, which is likely to lead to a crisis that will mirror the collapse of the
subprime mortgage market."). Nonetheless, this argument can be asserted separate and apart
from the question of whether the Federal Reserve's monetary policy during the period was too
easy. For a discussion of monetary policy issues, see John B. Taylor, The Fed and the Crisis:
A Reply to Ben Bernanke, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/NAWSJ_
PUB:SB 10001424052748703481004574646100272016422.html (arguing that monetary pol-
icy in the early years of the decade was too loose and acted as a subsidy for borrowers). But
see Ben Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Speech at the Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Economic Association: Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble (Jan. 3, 2010), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm (defending the
monetary policy of the Federal Reserve as appropriate in light of the available data).
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example, has increased at two to three times the rate of inflation over the
last three decades." The promise of accessible loans has made loan-
eligible middle- and lower-income students an easy mark for unabashed,
aggressive student-loan marketing. 12 "The end result," in fact, "has been
an unprecedented, debt-fueled wealth transfer from students of modest
means to the increasingly prosperous higher education industry and op-
portunistic student loan lenders."' 3 The dire unintended consequences of
these programs have left the federal government to shoulder an unenvi-
able burden as the underwriter of discontent. 14
For the sake of brevity, this Article will focus on the challenges
facing a single segment of the American higher education market of par-
II By any measure, the numbers are dramatic. For instance, according to the ABA, while
the cost of living in America rose 28% from 1992 to 2002, the tuition at public law schools
rose 134% for in-state residents and 100% for non-residents. Private law school tuition rose
by 76% during the same period. See Am. BAR Ass'N, COMM'N ON LOAN REPAYMENT AND
FORGIVENESS, LiFrING THE BURDEN: LAW STUDENT DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE
10 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/lrap/downloadslrapfinal
report.pdf [hereinafter ABA REPAYMENT REPORT]. See also Amir Efrati, Hard Case: Job
Market Wanes for U.S. Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2007, at Al ("Tuition growth at law
schools has almost tripled the rate of inflation over the past 20 years."); Maimon Schwarz-
schild, The Ethics and Economics of American Legal Education Today, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 1, 5 (2008) (noting that until the 1980s, law school tuition "did not generally rise ahead
of the general rate of inflation").
12 See Morrissey, supra note 7, at 280 (observing that "the ever-rising tuition that has
made possible all of [the] admirable pr6gress [of law schools] has led to serious problems in
the very system it has financed").
13 Michael C. Macchiarola, "Too Big to Fail" Goes to College, MINDING THE CAMPUS
(June 21, 2010), http://www.mindingthecampus.com/originals/2010/06/too_bigtojfailgoes-
toscolleg.html. See, e.g., William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, The New Math of
Legal Education, 12 YOUNG LAW. 1, 1 (July 2008), available at http://www.abanet.orglyld/tyll
july08/julyO8.pdf [hereinafter Henderson & Morriss, The New Math] (noting that "[t]he aver-
age debt owed at graduation soared 431 percent between 1987 and 2005, from $16,000 to
$85,000"); Mary Pilon, Student-Loan Debt Surpasses Credit Cards, REAL TIME ECONOMICS-
WSJ BLOGS (Aug. 9, 2010, 1:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.comleconomics/2010/08/09/student-
loan-debt-surpasses-credit-cards/.
14 As far back as 1987, then-Secretary of Education William J. Bennett lamented the fact
that "increases in financial aid in recent years have enabled colleges and universities blithely to
raise their tuitions, confident that [flederal loan subsidies would help cushion the increase."
William J. Bennett, Our Greedy Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1987, at A31. See also Char-
lotte Allen, Waste and Folly in Student Loans, MINDING THE CAMPUS (Jan. 5, 2010), http://
www.mindingthecampus.comloriginals/2010/01/shortly-afterhis-inauguration.html (noting
that the "notion of using government aid to support mass higher education as a good thing in
itself became permanently entrenched in the public mind," yet "it is difficult to measure ex-
actly what the programs have accomplished and easy to enumerate a slew of unintended conse-
quences . . . ."); Jackson Toby, Subprime Student Loans, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Dec. 23, 2009),
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2009/12/23/toby (arguing that an unintended conse-
quence of making financing so easily available for anyone wishing to attend college is that
"serious study in high school has become optional."). For a discussion of the current federal
programs that support student borrowing, see infra Part I.B.4. For an understanding of the size
of the programs, see infra Appendix Figure 9.
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ticular importance to the legal community-law schools.15 The cost of a
legal education has saddled a generation of lawyers with unmanageable
student loan debt.16 In the process, the current structure of law school
financing has jeopardized the survival of many law schools17 and the
long-term supply of competent and willing lawyers,' 8 compromised the
availability of public service lawyers,19 and added to the great stress on
our nation's already fragile consumer-driven economy. 20 Aggravating
15 While each segment of the higher education industry has its own idiosyncrasies which
are beyond the scope of this Article, it is expected that the majority of the analysis and policy
recommendations developed herein have broader application to the higher education market as
a whole.
16 Not only has the absolute level of debt increased, but the percentage of students who
borrow to attend law school has also seen a dramatic increase. In the mid-1970s, for example,
only a modest percentage of students borrowed to pay the costs of a legal education. See ABA
REPAYMENT REPORT, supra note 11, at 17. The proportion continued to rise steadily through-
out the 1980s. In fact, by 2000, nearly seven out of every eight law students were borrowing
to finance their law school education. See id. During the 1990s alone, the average amounts
they were borrowing more than doubled; as of 2001, many law students borrowed more than
$80,000 for law school alone. See ABA REPAYMENT REPORT, supra note 11, at 17; Karen
Sloan, ABA Proposes Law Student Loan Relief, LAW.COM, (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.
law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202435359338 [hereinafter Sloan, Loan Relief] (noting that the
average public law school student graduate borrows $59,324 for law school).
17 Richard A. Matasar, The Rise and Fall of American Legal Education, 49 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 465, 468 (2004) [hereinafter Matasar, Rise and Fall] ("The mismatch between the
perceptions of what a legal education provides and the actuality of that experience can create
significant difficulties that will challenge the sustained viability of substantial numbers of
schools.").
18 See Schwarzschild, supra note 11, at 8 (observing that the current system of law
school financing "depends, obviously, on law students and their families continuing to be
willing and able to pay"). For an observation of a similar phenomenon in the field of educa-
tion, see LuKE SWARTHOUT, STATE PUB. INTEREST GRP. HIGHER EDUC. PROJECT, PAYING
BACK, NOT GIVING BACK: STUDENT DEBT'S NEGATIVE IMPACT ON PUBLIC SERVICE CAREER
OPPORTUNITIEs 4 (2006), available at http://www.pirg.org/highered/payingback.pdf? (observ-
ing that "[t]he prospect of burdensome debt likely deters skilled and dedicated college gradu-
ates from entering and staying in important careers educating our nation's children and helping
the country's most vulnerable populations"). But see Morrissey, supra note 7, at 268 (noting
that counter-cyclicality of law school admissions and observing that "[e]ven in times of de-
creased applications, there have always been more potential students seeking admission to law
school than there were positions available").
19 See generally ABA REPAYMENT REPORT, supra note 11, at 9 (concluding that "many
law students find that the rising cost of a legal education forces them to forego any form of
public service"). See also NAT'L Assoc. OP LAW PLACEMENT, FROM PAPERCHASE TO MONEY
CHASE: LAW SCHOOL DEBT SUBVERTS ROAD TO PUBLIC SERVICE 6 (2002) (finding that law
school debt prevented sixty-six percent of graduates from considering public interest or gov-
ernment employment).
20 See, e.g., Anne Marie Chaker, Students Borrow More than Ever for College, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at DI (noting, in the context of college borrowing, that "[t]he ripple
effects for today's heavily indebted young people are becoming palpable," and suggesting that
"tough loan payments are affecting major life decisions by recent graduates, forcing them to
put off traditional milestones-from buying a first home to even marriage and having chil-
dren"); AM. BAR Ass'N, COMM'N ON THE IMPACT OF THE EcON. CRISES ON THE PROFESSION &
LEGAL NEEDS, THE VALUE PROPOSITION OF ATrENDING LAW SCHOOL 3, available at http://
www.abanet.org/1sd/legaled/value.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter ABA, VALUE
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the predicament is the fact that, as we awake from our Great Recession,
today's students still confront soaring costs, but with less access than
ever to traditional sources of credit.21 In fact, the thesis of legal educa-
tion as an investment is now significantly strained for all but a small
minority of incoming law students. 22
This Article respects the fact that the decision making of each law
school applicant is based on a sui generis set of factors and does not
attempt to tread in this deeply personal territory. 23 However, certain
changes can improve the integrity and transparency of the information
available to all prospective law students, and anchor law school costs to
the value of student outcomes. In the end, such changes could signifi-
cantly ensure the sustainability of a legal academy that molds lawyers
PROPOSITION] ("High debt can limit career choices, prevent employment in the public service
sector, or delay home ownership or marriage.") (footnote omitted).
21 For a description of the recent unavailability of credit in the student loan market, and
the government's response, see infra Part I.B.4.ii. See also David Cho, As College Costs Rise,
Loans Become Harder to Get, WASH. PosT (Dec. 28, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/27/AR2009122702116.html?sid=ST2009122800127 (noting
that the "upheaval in financial markets did not just eliminate generous lending for home buy-
ers; it also ended an era of easy credit for students and their families facing the soaring cost of
a college degree"). Adding to an already troubling picture is the fact that students pressed to
borrow above the federal loan limits have increasingly turned to the private market which, as
costs continue to soar, has accounted for an ever-larger percentage of education lending. See
John Wasik, College Loan Market Is Getting Its Own Bailout, BLOOMBERG (June 2, 2008,
12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=Newsarchive&sid=AR5aM8VhB7y
&refer--Columnist-wasik (noting that, according to the College Board, "private loan volume
has quadrupled over the [ten] years through 2006," to the point where one in five students now
have private loans). See also 2008 FastWeb Student Loan Survey, FINAID, http://www.
finaid.org/loans/studentloansurvey.phtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2010) (observing that "[m]ore
than a third of students use non-education debt to pay for school, such as borrowing from
friends and family, credit cards or personal unsecured loans from a bank").
22 See ABA, VALUE PROPOSITION, supra note 20, at 1 ("The combination of the rising
cost of a legal education and the realities of the legal job market mean that going to law school
may not pay off for a large number of law students."); Jack Crittenden, A Wise Investment?,
NAT'L JURIST, Mar. 2010, at 36 (observing, with respect to law school generally, that "tuition
and student debt loads have increased so much that the value proposition indeed appears out of
whack, especially given the new realities of lower starting salaries"); Efrati, supra note 11
(observing that "economic data suggest that prospects have grown bleaker for all but the top
students."). One law school professor asked:
Is it fair to recruit students into a situation where their economic futures are so
perilously mortgaged? And beyond that, is the current system even sustainable if
enough potential students come to realize that despite the obvious benefits of a legal
education, such a career path may only afford them negative financial returns on
their investments?
Morrissey, supra note 7, at 255. Cf Thomas H. Benton, Graduate School in the Humanities:
Just Don't Go, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 30, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/Gradu-
ate-School-in-the/44846 (arguing against the return on investment of an advanced degree in
the humanities and warning those who would pursue such a degree that "universities recognize
that their idealism and energy-and lack of information-are an exploitable resource").
23 See, e.g., ABA, VALUE PROPOSITION, supra note 20, at 1 ("Choosing to attend law
school is a big decision that prospective law students should not take lightly.").
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capable of assuming their place in what de Tocqueville labeled the
"highest political class, and the most cultivated portion of society." 24
This Article draws on enterprise liability theory and proposes a de-
rivatives-based approach to alleviating the American law school quag-
mire.2 5 Specifically, this Article suggests that borrower "put" rights
could be embedded into new student loan contracts. Such rights could
allow any law student borrower to obtain forgiveness of a portion of her
law school debt after a pre-set period of time provided that the student
satisfies certain objective criteria. These criteria would center on
whether, and to what extent, a particular student borrower's aggregate
post-law school earnings fail to meet or exceed predetermined
benchmarks. The risk and cost of the student borrower "put" right would
be borne primarily by those who, under the current law school financing
model, bear remarkably little of the risk yet reap the bulk of the benefits
of government-backed student loans: law schools and lenders. By plac-
ing at least some of the risk of noneconomic student outcomes on the law
schools and lenders, diligence will be encouraged at a loan's inception. 2 6
24 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 355 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry
Reeve trans., John Allyn 1874) (1835). Cf WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF
KING HENRY THE SIXTH, act 4, sc. 2, lines 76-77, in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE (Houghton
Mifflin ed., 1974) ("The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers.").
25 Although derivatives have been much maligned, if properly implemented, they can be
instrumental in restoring some balance and logic to this highly distorted market. Again, al-
though this proposal focuses on law schools for the sake of brevity, similar proposals could
and should be explored for other segments of the market. Notably, however, the increase in
tuition and fees has been more dramatic in the law school setting than in most other profes-
sional schools. See Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IssuEs RELATED TO LAW SCHOOL COST
AND ACCESS 16 (2009) [hereinafter GAO, COST AND ACCESS] (comparing tuition and fees at
professional schools for law, dentistry, veterinary and medical). Perhaps the most high-profile
chiding came from the "Oracle of Omaha":
The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost
certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear
.... Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control,
or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts . . . . In our view, however,
derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while
now latent, are potentially lethal.
Warren Buffett, Letter to Shareholders, in BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INc. 2002 ANN. REP. 15
(Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf. Lest an-
yone think that even Warren Buffett is beyond the hypocrisy that too routinely accompanies
the trading of derivatives, see Duff McDonald, Unwarranted: Does Buffett Deserve His
Outside Rep?, N.Y. MAG., May 31, 2010, available at http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/
66190/ (examining Buffett's various dealings, including his reported lobbying to grandfather
his own company's expansive derivatives portfolio from forthcoming financial regulatory re-
form rules, and noting that "his outsize reputation means he often gets a free pass on behavior
that others get called out on").
26 Because of a recent move toward direct federal lending in response to the increased
unavailability of credit, the lender may no longer prove a possible repository of this "put
risk"-leaving the law school. See discussion infra at I.B.4. In addition, keen observers of
our nation's recent financial crisis will recognize the lack of due diligence at a loan's inception
as a contributing factor to the creation of irresponsible loans in the nation's mortgage market.
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In turn, some rationality will be restored to law schools in particular, and
the higher education industry in general, which will help to control the
runaway costs and distorted structure of the industry.
This Article proceeds in six Parts. Part I examines the skyrocketing
cost of legal education and its causes. 2 7 This Part will briefly discuss the
curricular and financing trends that have shaped the current law school
landscape, and pulls no punches in laying blame. While there is little
sense in dwelling on the past,2 8 a full accounting of each party's role thus
far is necessary in order to proceed with eyes wide open. Ultimately, the
verdict for those involved in legal education will not concern the exis-
tence of a problem, but rather how it was addressed. In Part II, the Arti-
cle examines the stresses on the revenue side of the equation for a law
school graduate. In large measure, today's newly-minted attorney is not
likely to realize the pecuniary benefits that he once envisioned. 2 9 Part III
briefly explores the informational asymmetries that exist in the standard
Perhaps the most damning statistics on the deterioration of loan diligence are cited in a recent
article which notes that "[i]n 1990, one in 200 home-purchase loans (all government insured)
had a down payment of less than or equal to 3 percent. By 2003, one in seven home buyers
had such a low down payment, and by 2006 about one in three put no money down." Edward
Pinto, Subprime 2.0 Is Coming Soon to a Suburb Near You, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 7, 2010, 9:00
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-08/subprime-2-0-is-coming-soon-to-suburb-
near-you-commentary-by-edward-pinto.html. See also infra Parts IV. and V. (describing in-
formation-forcing devices that will encourage diligence).
27 An appreciation for (i) the history and development of the law school model and the
actions and incentives of its various stakeholders and (ii) the history of federal intervention in
student loan markets are essential to understanding how the system has driven itself to the
edge of such a precipice.
28 This Article contends, as George B. Shepherd and William G. Shepherd did some
twelve years ago, that many of the participants in the system of legal education are "public-
spirited and selfless." However, the current system has imposed large harms. Unfortunately,
the observations of twelve years ago largely hold true today:
Existing law faculty have gained, on balance, at the expense of their students, of
their universities, and of other potential faculty members to whom the system denies
teaching jobs. By suppressing potential new schools that would offer cheaper, more-
efficient legal education, the system has excluded many from the legal profession,
particularly the poor and minorities. It has raised the cost of legal services. And it
has, in effect, denied legal services to whole segments of our society.
George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation and
Legal Education, 19 CARDOzo L. REv. 2091, 2094 (1998).
29 While much of this shortfall stems from the current economic lassitude and its effects,
a systemically encouraged pattern of obfuscation must also bear a large measure of responsi-
bility for the discontent. The adequacy of the information available to prospective law stu-
dents is in no way commensurate with the magnitude of their investment decision.
Nevertheless, there is a high probability that law students will continue to enroll in large num-
bers and take on increasingly burdensome education debt loads in the process, resulting in
growing strains on the nation's economy. See Sloan, Proceed with Caution, supra note 4
(noting that the "message of caution doesn't appear to have hit home just yet" as
"[a]pplications to ABA accredited law schools increased by 5 percent for this year's incoming
class and the number taking the Law School Admission Test this October grew by nearly 20
percent").
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law school bargain: between law students on the one hand, and law
schools and student loan lenders on the other. Borrowing from enterprise
liability theory, this Part lays the theoretical groundwork for a methodol-
ogy that places at least a part of the risk of unsatisfactory student out-
comes where it belongs-on the lenders and the law schools. Part IV
introduces and explains the proposed methodology, highlighting its at-
tempt to alleviate the effects of informational asymmetries and indirectly
reshape the legal higher education industry to provide superior value pro-
positions to students. Part V anticipates and answers some of the likely
criticisms of the solution proposed by this Article. Finally, Part VI offers
a brief conclusion.
I. THE RUNAWAY COSTS OF AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION
A. By the Numbers
To say that the cost of an American law school education has ex-
ploded in recent years is an understatement.30 In the two decades ending
in 2007, for example, the American Bar Association (ABA) calculates
that the average annual cost of attending a private law school (including
tuition and fees) has increased almost fourfold, from $8,911 to
$32,367.31 One recent article observes that the full-time tuitions of pri-
vate law schools in the top 30 of the U.S. News & World Report rankings
"range from a high of $46,670 at Cornell University to a low of $36,297
at Washington & Lee University, with an average of $41,181.1"32 Ex-
penses, book fees and other incidentals also add significantly to the aver-
age law school student's burden, as does the opportunity cost of foregone
employment during the three years of law school attendance.33
30 See, e.g., Crittenden, supra note 22, at 39 (observing that "[l]aw school tuition has
been on a mad dash upwards for the last [twenty] years, fueling a dangerous rise in student
debt").
31 See Law School Tuition 1985-2008, AM. BAR Ass'N 3, http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/statistics/stats.html (follow "Law School Tuition" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 30,
2010). During that same period, the increase for nonresident students at public law schools
was even more dramatic-growing from an average of $5,616 to $26,691. See id. at 2. With
their average tuition increasing more than six-fold from $2,398 to $15,455, in-state residents at
public law schools fared worst of all during the period. See id. at 1. In fact, the average and
median tuition and fees has increased every single year (at both public and private law
schools) since 1985. See generally id.; see also infra Appendix Figures 6 and 7 (illustrating
the change over time in mean and median law school tuitions, respectively).
32 Schlunk, supra note 5, at 5.
33 For the "Average Living and Book Expenses for Single Students Living on Campus"
from 1990 to 2008, see infra Appendix Figure 8. It should be noted that ABA Standard 304(f)
limits the outside employment of a student taking twelve or more credits to twenty hours per
week, compromising the ability of a student to mitigate some of this cost. See AM. BAR
Ass'N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STANDARDS AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL FOR LAW SCHOOLs 2009-2010 24 (2010), available at http://www.
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Not surprisingly, the average amount borrowed by law students
seeking to fund their law school education has seen an increase no less
dramatic. 3 4 In recent years, students of all kinds have been turning to the
unregulated private loan market-the riskiest and most expensive form
of debt-in greater and greater numbers.35 If these trends continue un-
abated, "the consequences will be severe." 36 Increasingly burdensome
debt loads may lead student borrowers to defer "major life decisions like
the purchase of a first home or marriage,"37 which have broader implica-
tions for the nation's economy. As America struggles to emerge from
the Great Recession, "[e]ducational debt hobbles the very group of risk
takers and innovators that has historically rejuvenated the American
economy when . . . it starts to flag."3 8 Today's would-be trailblazers are
joining the postgraduate world saddled with "reduced access to higher
education, diminished life choices, and increasing rates of catastrophic
loan default." 39
While simple inflation has certainly played a role in the growth of
higher education costs (in general) and law school costs in particular,40
abanet.org/legaled/standards/20072008StandardsWebContent/Chapter%203.pdf [hereinafter
ABA, LAW SCHOOL APPROVAL, CHAPTER THREE].
34 See Average Amount Borrowed for Law School 2001-2008, AM. BAR Ass'N, availa-
ble at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/stats.html (follow "Average Amount Borrowed"
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 30, 2010) [hereinafter ABA, Average Amount Borrowed]. The
ABA only provides data back to the 2001-2002 academic year. See id. The average amount
borrowed to fund a public and private law school education has grown from $46,499 and
$70,147 in that year to $59,324 and $91,506 in the 2007-2008 academic year. For a presenta-
tion of the data, see infra Appendix Figure 5. And, the story might actually be worse than it
appears. See, e.g., Andrew Gillen, The Amazing College Debt Bubble: Teaching One Student
Costs Only $1,456 A Year?, MINDING THE CAMPUS (Sept. 20, 2010) http://www.mindingthe-
campus.com/originals/2010/09/the-amazing-college debtbubbl.html (commenting that
"[liargely ignored in the discussion, however, is the shadow debt, which consists of unortho-
dox methods of borrowing for college, including home equity loans and lines of credit, retire-
ment account loans, credit card debt, and run-of-the-mill bank loans").
35 See Kevin Carey & Erin Dillon, Drowning in Debt: The Emerging Student Loan Cri-
sis, EDuc. SECTOR (July 8, 2009), http://www.educationsector.orglanalysis/analysis-show.
htm?doc-id=964333 (noting that, in this market, students "have the least protection and pay
the highest rates").
36 Id.
37 Elana Berkowitz & John Burton, Burying College Grads in Debt, ALTERNET (Nov.
28, 2005), http://www.altemet.org/wiretap/28641/.
3 8 Id.
39 Id. For a recent exposition of the rising default rate among student borrowers, see
Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Default Rate Is Continuing to Increase, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 14,
2010, at A15 ("Education Secretary Arne Duncan said Monday that the overall student loan
default rate in the 2008 fiscal year, the latest period for which data is available, was 7 percent,
up from 6.7 percent the year before and 5.2 percent in the 2006 fiscal year.").
40 In fact, inflation only explains $7,353 (31.3%) of the two-decade increase in the cost
of attending private law school cited by the ABA. Simply applying the Consumer Price Index
for the period suggests that $8,911 in 1987 would have the buying power of $16,264 in 2007.
See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/
cpicalc.pl (last visited July 5, 2010).
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several structural factors unique to the law school model explain the bulk
of the increased cost. 4 1 To understand each of the factors and their re-
spective effects in the proper context, the history and development of
legal education and its system of financing must be explored. Each of
the factors described in this Part has played an important role in churning
the rising tide of tuitions.
B. The Causes: A Combustible Mix of Accreditation, Rankings,
Peculiar Incentives and Federal Encouragement
This Article is certainly not the first to contend that the emphasis on
the current law school model to the virtual exclusion of alternative forms,
and the accompanying protection afforded by the ABA accreditation pro-
cess, has impeded true competition.4 2 As is invariably the case when
competition is stifled, the results have been less than optimal for consum-
ers. In effect, those who wish to purchase a legal education are left little
choice in terms of the size and shape of their product, with accredited
law schools regulated right down to the number of minutes a student
spends in the classroom.43 Such uniform requirements leave substan-
tially diminished room for price differentiation, effectively forcing all
consumers to purchase the luxury model." In addition to the barriers
created by the accreditation process, a law school's nonprofit form and
its governance structure have resulted in faculty capture, allowed schools
41 Dean Matasar points out that "[flor years, the law school market has been protected
from fears that they are pricing their product out of reach for most students." Matasar, Rise
and Fall, supra note 17, at 474. He lists several factors supporting his contention. They
include the fact that (i) educational costs are highly-leveraged (i.e. supported by borrowing),
(ii) lenders have been very willing to lend, (iii) lenders have been encouraged to be risky in
lending funds to students because "substantial portions of students' loans are federally guaran-
teed," (iv) lawyer salaries have been able to support debt burdens, and (v) students have
avoided failures by relying on family members for financial assistance. See Matasar, Rise and
Fall, supra note 17, at 474-75. It is clear that many of these factors are under significant
strain (or no longer available) in today's environment.
42 Economic theory has long taught that the presence of a cartel brings restricted output,
raised prices, reduced cost-efficiency, stunted innovation, and overall unfairness. See Shep-
herd & Shepherd, supra note 28, at 2096-97 & n.5 (citing to various economics texts to
describe the effect of cartels).
43 Standard 304(b) requires "as a condition for graduation, successful completion of a
course of study in residence of not fewer than 58,000 minutes of instruction time, except as
otherwise provided. At least 45,000 of these minutes shall be by attendance in regularly
scheduled class sessions at the law school." See ABA, LAW SCHOOL APPROVAL, CHAPTER
THREE, supra note 33, at 24.
44 As one former law school dean quipped to the Authors, "[W]hy do we insist that all
law students buy gold-plated Cadillacs?" For further exploration of this sentiment, see Frank
J. Macchiarola & Michael C. Macchiarola, Does U.S. News Make Law Schools More Expen-
sive?, MINDING THE CAMPUS (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.mindingthecampus.com/originals/
2010/01/doesus-newsmake lawschools.html (noting that "the virtual monopoly on bar ad-
mission accorded to the 200 ABA-approved law schools excludes prospective attorneys who
cannot afford the cost of a legal education in the way in which it is currently delivered").
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to make noneconomic decisions, and discouraged behavior responsive to
the needs of the law student as consumer. In recent years, the prolifera-
tion of law school rankings has only added to this combustible mix by
encouraging additional noneconomic behavior at the individual law
school level.
Unfortunately, the efforts of the federal government to artificially
bolster the student loan market-efforts aimed at access and choice-
have facilitated noneconomic behaviors and allowed the costs of ABA
requirements, faculty capture, and the rankings tournament to persist.
Without the various federal subsidies that foster easy access to financing,
market forces would have confronted noneconomic behaviors long ago.
Consequently, the bulk of law school applicants (and, as a result, law
schools) would have faced difficult value-based decisions regarding their
educations. Instead, federal policies have allowed a generation of stu-
dents to sidestep such choices, in favor of leaving them saddled with
what one commentator called "indenture-like loans." 4 5 If the prospective
law student ever becomes better informed, his continued acceptance of
and acquiescence to the existing model might be in jeopardy.46
1. A Brief History of the Law School and Its Accreditation
Law school matriculation has not always been the predominant path
to a career as a practicing lawyer in the United States.47 In fact, in the
early days of our nation, the most common method of preparation for a
legal career was through apprenticeships in the offices of members of the
45 Jessica Calefati, Failure Insurance for College Drop-Outs?, MOTHER JONES MOJO
BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 1:45 PM), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/01/failure-insurance-
would-be-college-drop-outs.
46 Cf Rebecca R. Ruiz, Recession Spurs Interest in Graduate, Law Schools, N.Y. TimEs,
Jan. 9, 2010, at A18 (observing a jump in applications to law schools in the face of "the
recession and the resulting shortage of good jobs"). For a discussion of how informational
deficiencies impair the ability of potential law students to make fully informed decisions about
the loan burdens arising in connection with law school matriculation, see infra Part [ll.A.
47 See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for
This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINcAL L. REv. 1, 2 ("[T]he notion of a 'law school'
education in the United States is only a few hundred years old, and the requirement that law-
yers in this country actually receive a law school education rather than entering the bar after
reading law or some form of apprenticeship is not even 100 years old.").
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bar.4 8 The quality of these apprenticeships varied greatly.49 Over time,
however, "the place of lawyers generally in American society ... greatly
diminished from that which the relatively small number of lawyers had
occupied in the early days of the Republic."50 In the period leading up to
the Civil War, there was little consensus as to what a lawyer's education
and training should be, how one should go about becoming a lawyer, the
scope of a lawyer's service, and what regulations should apply to lawyers
engaged in their profession.51 Largely in response to this uncertainty,
and in an attempt to address the disdain for lawyers that had flourished
during the populist era of Andrew Jackson, "groups of lawyers-many of
whom had elite practices serving the new economic interests . . .
launched a movement to raise standards and to promote a sense of pro-
fession." 52 Bar associations sprung up at the state and local levels, cul-
minating with the creation of the American Bar Association in 1878.53
The ABA wasted little time in establishing a Standing Committee on
Legal Education and charging it with "developing a program which visu-
alized a unitary legal profession with common admissions and educa-
tional requirements for the entire country." 54
At the same time that the bar association movement was gaining
momentum, Christopher Columbus Langdell left the practice of law in
New York City to become the Dean of Harvard Law School.55 Langdell
48 LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTIN-
uum 103 (Robert MacCrate ed., 1992) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]
(describing the beginnings of the United States' legal tradition, and commenting that cele-
brated attorneys such as Thomas Jefferson, Daniel Webster, John Adams, John Quincy Adams,
and John Marshall all served as apprentices). See also Paul D. Carrington, Legal Education
for the People: Populism and the Civic Virtue, 43 KAN. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994) ("Some of those
who became certified without training taught themselves enough law to become competent and
some-Abraham Lincoln being the paradigm became very competent indeed."); Shepherd &
Shepherd, supra note 28, at 2120-22 (noting that through the nineteenth century and well into
the twentieth century, many fine attorneys entered the field without following the current
model of three years of post-undergraduate academic study). Cf Schwarzschild, supra note
11, at 3 (observing that "[a]lmost everywhere else in the world, law is an undergraduate sub-
ject, followed by a bar exam and usually some kind of apprenticeship").
49 See Carrington, supra note 48, at 7 ("[T]here were surely some citizens who were
victimized by the incompetence or venality of counsel who would not have been permitted to
practice in a more controlled environment.").
50 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 48, at 104 (quoting L.M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAw 652 (2d ed. 1985)) (noting that, in the period leading up to the Civil War, the
"country was flooded with lawyers who were mediocre or worse"). Cf DE TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 24, at 355 (describing the appropriate social status of lawyers).
51 See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 48, at 105.
52 Id. at 105.
53 For a brief history of the ABA, see History of the American Bar Association, Am. BAR
Ass'N, http://www.abanet.orglabout/history.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2009).
54 See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 48, at 106.
55 For a fine account of Langdell's view of the law, see generally Dennis Patterson,
Langdell's Legacy, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 196 (1995) (arguing that Langdell's scientific approach
to law school study explains the current pedagogical interest in interdisciplinary legal studies).
2010] 81
82 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
"believed that law should be studied within the four walls of the univer-
sity, away from its practice, in much the way that a scientist discovers
scientific principles within the sterile confines of the laboratory."56 His
achievement was nothing less than the modem law school, in which
would-be legal scientists dissected appellate court opinions in order to
explore legal doctrines and principles.57 In essence, Langdell elevated
legal education from a trade to a profession, treating the law as a science
to be studied as objective theory.58 For a growing bar association move-
ment eager to standardize and legitimize the legal profession, Langdell's
innovation could not have come at a better time. And so, with interests
aligned, the strong alliance between the ABA and the modem law school
was born:
In 1881 the ABA initiated what became a century-long
campaign, passing a resolution recommending attend-
ance at law school for three years and that all states give
credit toward required apprenticeship, for time spent in
law school. With bar leaders advocating the notion that
a uniform type of academic law school was needed to
control entry into the bar, a national alliance developed
between the newly organized bar and the burgeoning law
schools.59
The effects of this alliance quickly became apparent. Soon after the
establishment of the ABA, the number of law schools and law students
began to explode, and the ABA sought to curb the number of attorneys
that were flooding the profession by raising the barriers to entry.60 In
1920, the ABA established a special committee on legal education,
chaired by Elihu Root, to strengthen the alliance between the ABA and
law schools. 61 The Root Committee delivered its report in 1921 in which
it concluded that "only in law school could an adequate legal education
be obtained." 62 The Committee suggested two years of college as a pre-
56 W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1997) (footnote
omitted).
57 See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 48, at 106.
58 See Carter, supra note 56, at 2 (describing Langdell as "a man who purported to teach
law, but despised the practice of it").
59 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 48, at 106.
60 Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 28, at 2115 ("From 1890 to 1930, the number of
law schools tripled, and the number of law students increased more than eight[-]fold. ... The
new law schools, which were extremely profitable, produced waves of new lawyers who com-
peted with established lawyers." (footnote omitted)).
61 For a comprehensive account of the career of Elihu Root, see WARREN ZIMMERMAN,
FIRST GREAT TRIUMPH: How FIVE AMERICANS MADE THEIR COUNTRY A WORLD POWER
123-48 (2002).
62 ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s
TO THE 1980s 115 (1983) (quoting Elihu Root, Report of the Special Committee to the Section
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requisite for law school admission, and that the ABA create a council on
legal education charged with the power to accredit law schools. 63
The rise of the law school accreditation process hit full stride fol-
lowing the Root Committee's efforts; since then, in aspiring to advance
the lawyer's professional stature, the accreditation process has regulated
legal training with the dual intentions of ensuring that students receive a
quality education and that competent lawyers are available to represent
clients.M Perhaps the most effective step to limit entry into the profes-
sion was the ABA's lobbying of "state legislatures and supreme courts to
require bar applicants to be graduates of accredited law schools." 65 In
effect, the success of this effort "ensured that anyone who apprenticed in
a law office or graduated from a proprietary school could not obtain a
license to practice law." 6 6 Consequently, the ABA's ability to define the
baseline for the acceptable level of preparation required for a legal ca-
reer67 had the effect of "wrest[ing] legal education from the control of
the practicing profession . . . [and] plac[ing] it increasingly in the law
schools."68 Today, as a result of these efforts, the educational journey
for virtually all lawyers begins at the front steps of an accredited law
school.69 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the law school accredita-
tion process is a relatively recent, and politically driven, development.70
of Legal Educators and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association, 1921 ABA
SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR). See also Christopher T. Cunniffe, The
Case for the Alternative Third-Year Program, 61 ALB. L. REV. 85, 87-90 (1997) (summariz-
ing some of the arguments offered in support of the Root Committee's findings). See gener-
ally Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L.
REv. 727, 758-59 (2000) (noting that in the 1920s, elite law schools began to require that
applicants have some college education and also experimented with aptitude testing).
63 See James P. White, The American Bar Association Law School Approval Process: A
Century Plus of Public Service, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283, 286-88 (1995). See also
Rachel F. Moran, Of Rankings and Regulation: Are the U.S. News & World Report Rankings
Really a Subversive Force in Legal Education?, 81 IND. L.J. 383, 392 (2006) (citing RICHARD
L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 48-68 (1989)) (noting that the new standards were an attempt
to "assuage anxieties about unrestricted access to the profession").
6 Moran, supra note 63, at 383.
65 Id. at 392.
66 Id. (noting that the campaign was so successful that the number of states requiring a
degree from an accredited law school as a condition to sitting for the bar exam went from nine
in 1935 to forty-one in 1941).
67 See Mark Greenbaum, No More Room at the Bench, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2010), http:/
/articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/08/opinion/la-oe-greenbaum8-2010janO8 ("Unlike other profes-
sional fields such as medicine and public health, whose preeminent professional organizations
do not have control over the accreditation of schools and programs, the ABA exercises unfet-
tered power over the accreditation of law schools.").
68 Moran, supra note 63, at 392.
69 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 48, at 113. See Denise Rothbardt, ABA Accreditation:
Educational Standards and Its Focus on Output Requirements, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
461, 462 (1999) (commenting that "obtaining a J.D. from an ABA-accredited law school is a
virtual necessity to practice law").
70 Moran, supra note 63, at 391.
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Advances in legal education itself were slow in coming through the
first three-quarters of the twentieth century, and despite a cacophony of
criticism, 71 law schools perpetuated Langdell's dual emphases on broad
legal doctrine and analysis with near uniformity. 72 As a result, little time
or attention was devoted to specialties or practical expertise; the underly-
ing assumption was that law graduates would learn these skills in "actual
practice settings" upon graduation.73 Over time, critiques grew in vol-
ume, primarily complaining that the intellectual chasm between the acad-
emy and the practice of law actually reduced the academy's influence.
District of Columbia Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards sounded this view
rather persuasively in 1992:
Because too few law professors are producing articles or
treatises that have direct utility for judges, administra-
tors, legislators, and practitioners, too many important
social issues are resolved without the needed input from
academic lawyers. The problem is not simply the num-
ber of "practical" scholars, but their waning prestige
within the academy. 74
For Edwards, Langdell's model had found its limits when the ma-
jority of law professors "considered themselves academics first and law-
yers only by the sheerest of happenstance."75 In such a system, it was
unsurprising that law students could "understand and apply a theoretical
framework and therefore think beyond the mundane in assessing the
work of the legal profession," but consistently underperform when con-
71 For the best summary of the various criticisms of the casebook method during this
period, see Barry et al., supra note 47, at 5-9.
72 George S. Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 162, 164-65 (1974). For a good summary of the attacks on Langdell and his methods,
throughout the better part of the century, see Ronald H. Silverman, Weak Law Teaching: Adam
Smith and a New Model of Merit Pay, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267, 272-78 (2000).
73 John S. Elson, The Regulation of Legal Education: The Potential for Implementing the
MacCrate Report's Recommendations for Curricular Reform, 1 CLNICAL L. REv. 363,
369-70 (1994).
74 Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 34 (1992) (accusing many law schools of "abandon[ing]
their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and
pedagogy"). Judge Edwards was not much more forgiving of the behavior of law firms, hold-
ing the firms and the schools responsible for causing real damage to the profession:
Many law firms have also abandoned their place, by pursuing profit above all else.
while the schools are moving toward pure theory, the firms are moving toward pure
commerce, and the middle ground-ethical practice-has been deserted by both.
This disjunction calls into question our status as an honorable profession.
Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
75 Edwards, supra note 74, at 35.
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fronted with the realities of legal practice, where theory was of little
use. 76
Over the second half of the twentieth century, and largely in re-
sponse to criticisms like this one,'77 the law school curriculum grew by
leaps and bounds, with pedagogical change translating into costs both in
terms of what law schools taught and how they taught it. Dean Garvey
of Boston College explains the "what" by distinguishing law school from
America's favorite burger joint:
McDonald's hires more employees as its customer base
expands; it builds more and bigger stores as the demand
for its hamburgers increases. Law schools grow at a
much faster rate than their customer base. To put it in
the terms we usually employ, the student/faculty ratio is
constantly decreasing.78
The ballooning faculty size is dictated by the need to teach a con-
stantly expanding curriculum, and to respond to a widening number of
legal specialties. Simply put, "There is much more law today than there
was 20, 40, and 60 years ago." 79
The "how" of legal education began to come into additional focus in
1987, when the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar examined the gulf between the academy and the practicing bar. The
Section ultimately published its findings as the MacCrate Report.80
While the authors of the Report yearned for fundamental practical skills
to be taught in every law school,81 they were cognizant of the costs that
this goal entailed. 8 2 In reality, few schools can afford to turn a blind eye
76 Id. at 39.
77 See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 72, at 274-78 (summarizing the various criticisms of
legal education). See also Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don't Practice: Why Law
Faculties' Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Practical Compe-
tencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REv. (forthcoming Nov. 2010)
(stating that contemporary scholarship has "lost its practical moorings").
78 John H. Garvey, The Business of Running a Law School, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 37,
37-38 (2001) ("One reason for this is scientific progress.").
79 Id. at 38.
80 The resulting MacCrate Report, published in 1992, defined ten "Fundamental Lawyer-
ing Skills" essential for every attorney: (1) problem solving, (2) legal analysis and reasoning,
(3) legal research, (4) factual investigation, (5) communication, (6) counseling, (7) negotiation,
(8) litigation and alternative dispute resolution procedure, (9) organization and management of
legal work, and (10) recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas. See MACCRATE REPORT,
supra note 48, at 138-40.
81 Id. at 128-29.
82 See id. at 250-51; Memorandum 93-32 from Carl C. Monk, Exec. Director, Am. As-
soc. of Law Schools, AALS Response to the Report of the ABA Task Force on Law School
and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (MacCrate Report) 3 (May 18, 1993).
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to the costs attendant to an emphasis on the clinical curriculum.8 3 The
Report, therefore, expressed concern that its Statement of Skills and Val-
ues not be narrowly construed as the criterion for a standardized curricu-
lum or the measure of law school accreditation, and that all curricular
planning should take place within the context of a particular school's
resources. 8 4 The ABA has shown less restraint, amending its Standards
for Approval of Law Schools in 1996 to require "at least one rigorous
writing experience," "adequate opportunities for instruction in profes-
sional skills," and "live-client or other real-life practice experiences."85
Today, "clinical programs ha[ve] become a part of the curriculum at vir-
tually every law school in the United States." 86
The increased emphasis on practical learning, advanced by the find-
ings of the MacCrate Report, has been a main culprit in the rise in the
cost of legal education.87 While undoubtedly improving the overall ex-
perience for students and addressing much of the practical learning defi-
ciency that has existed for decades, the clinical education programs that
have continued to attach to the law school curricula, both pre- and post-
MacCrate, simply cost a great deal more per student hour of contact than
the large Langdellian lecture courses. In turn, schools have struggled to
address the economics of the corresponding increase in faculty size.88
83 See Barry et al., supra note 47, at 18 ("[It] is impossible to imagine the future of
clinical legal education without discussing the financial costs.").
84 See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 48, at 128.
85 See Garvey, supra note 78, at 39 & n.4 (citing AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARD OF AP-
PROVAL FOR LAW SCHOOLs § 302(a)(2)-(3), (d)).
86 Barry et al., supra note 47, at 21.
87 See generally William R. Trail & William D. Underwood, The Decline of Professional
Legal Training and a Proposal for Its Revitalization in Professional Law Schools, 48 BAYLOR
L. REv. 201, 240 (1996) (observing that "[e]ffective skills training tends to be more expensive
than other aspects of legal education because of the lower faculty-student ratios generally
required to provide necessary supervision and feedback"). However, in the period immedi-
ately preceding publication of the MacCrate Report, overall law school expenditures rose
173.9%, whereas expenditures for clinical education programs rose only 92.5%. See MAC-
CRATE REPORT, supra note 48, at 249-50.
88 One of the more interesting recent examples is the "transactional lab" approach to
teaching transactional lawyering skills-an approach that has overcome some of the budgetary
pressures with an increased reliance on the generosity of practicing lawyers. See Robert C.
Illig, The Oregon Method: An Alternative Modelfor Teaching Transactional Law, 59 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 221, 222-23 (2009). Most recently, the public law schools have suffered an additional
shock in the form of reduced state funding for their programs. As a result, the tuition at some
public schools has approached those of some of their private competitors. See ABA REPAY-
MEr REPORT, supra note 11, at 16 (observing that the funding from state legislatures as a
percentage of costs has continued to decline at public law schools for some time). See also
GAO, COST AND ACCESS, supra note 25, at 29 (noting that, in 2008, six public law schools had
resident tuition and fees greater than $30,000); Karen Sloan, At Public Law Schools, Tuition
Jumps Sharply, LAW.COM (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1202432727154&slreturn=l&hbxlogin=1 [hereinafter Sloan, Tuition Jumps Sharply] ("School
administrators say that the unusually large tuition hikes for the coming academic year are
spurred, for the most part, by cuts in public funding-with endowment losses, initiatives to
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Increasingly, the cost-effective law school experience is becoming a
thing of the past.
2. The Rankings Game
Cost-effective legal education suffered another setback with the in-
troduction and subsequent proliferation of law school rankings. Perhaps
more than any other single factor, the debut of competitive law school
rankings by U.S. News & World Report in the late 1980s 89 "set off a
frenzied rivalry among law schools." 90 Today, law students, prospective
law students, deans, professors, and alumni anxiously await delivery of
the annual publication of the magazine's list.91 Nevertheless, many criti-
ques (and fewer defenses) of the U.S. News rankings have come fast and
furious in recent years.92 Several appraisals resemble those articulated
by Dean Cass of Boston University:
The U.S. News rankings look at criteria that cannot pos-
sibly capture critical aspects of legal education. They do
improve their schools and pressure to keep up with competing institutions also playing a
part.").
89 See J. Paul Lomio & Erika V. Wayne, Ranking of Top Law Schools, 1987-2006 8
(March 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/publica-
tions/projectslrps/pdflomiowayne rp4.pdf.
90 Morrissey, supra note 7, at 261. See Richard A. Matasar, Defining Our Responsibili-
ties: Being an Academic Fiduciary, 17 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 67, 83 (2008) [hereinafter
Matasar, Academic Fiduciary] ("Every law school, student, faculty member, or graduate
would prefer to have his or her school 'ranked' higher."); David A. Thomas, The Law School
Rankings Are Harmful Deceptions: A Response to Those Who Praise the Rankings and a
Suggestion for a Better Approach to Evaluating Law Schools, 40 Hous. L. REv. 419, 419-20
(2003) ("Nothing has had a more profound impact on legal education in the past generation
than the phenomenal prominence of law school rankings, especially the rankings published by
[the] U.S. News & World Report."); see also Brian Leiter, The Most Important Developments
(for Good or Ill) in the Legal Academy Since 2000, BRiAN LErrER's L. Scii. REP.'s BLOG
(Dec. 18, 2009, 4:29 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2009/12/the-most-impor-
tant-developments-for-good-or-ill-in-the-legal-academy-since-2000.html (declaring U.S.
News' law school rankings as the "Condorcet" winner).
91 See, e.g., Scott Baker, Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, The Rat-Race as an Informa-
tion-Forcing Device, 81 IND. L.J. 53, 77 (2006) (noting that "[e]ven at top schools, students
convene town hall meetings and write op-ed pieces in the student newspapers when the
school's ranking slips," and that "[miany law professors look to U.S. News when deciding
which student journal-from among the hundreds of such journals-to submit [their
articles]").
92 For a rather exhaustive list of the scholarship concerning the rankings and their effects
on legal education, see Theodore P. Seto, Understanding the U.S. News Law School Rankings,
60 SMU L. REv. 493, 493 n.1 (2007). In a recent rebuke of the U.S. News rankings, Federal
District Court Judge Louis Pollak answered his own question of whether the rankings are a
"useful endeavor or a counter-productive one" by declaring them to be "an incubus, bad for the
health of legal education." Louis H. Pollak, Why Trying to Rank Law Schools Numerically Is
a Non-productive Undertaking: An Article on the U.S. News & World Report 2009 List of
"The Top 100 Schools," 1 DREXEL L. REv. 52, 52-53 (2009) (challenging the U.S. News
rankings as a non-productive endeavor, yet curiously offering an alternative methodology
whereby law school deans and professors assess the relative quality of law schools).
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not measure, or even encompass a good proxy for,
among other things, the quality of teaching, the scholarly
product of a faculty, the mode of instruction, [or] the
nature, scope, and organization of the curriculum.93
Apart from any single critique of the U.S. News' rankings, the meth-
odology must be understood, first and foremost, as the creation of a
profit-making enterprise.94 While the ABA's processes are born of a de-
sire for standards and values to protect the consumers of legal education
and the public, and are the handiwork of dedicated professionals, the
U.S. News editors are bound by no such restraint.95 To view the two then
as moral equivalents would be incorrect.
Aside from objections to the particular ranking variables and their
attendant weightings, few can dispute that the various systems offered
thus far tend to measure a school's worth based on "input" criteria.96
Not surprisingly, LSAT scores and grade point averages of incoming stu-
dents have come to rule the day in most of these methodologies, with one
study suggesting that, for some schools, roughly ninety percent of the
difference in U.S. News' pecking order is attributable to the median
LSAT score of an incoming class.97 Of course, the "primary alternative
93 Ronald A. Cass, So, Why Do You Want To Be a Lawyer? What the ABA, the AALS,
and U.S. News Don't Know that We Do, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 573, 574 (2000).
94 See Scott Jaschik, Would U.S. News Make Up Fake Data?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar.
12, 2007), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/03/12/usnews.
95 The ABA itself has recently taken aim at the U.S. News rankings claiming, among
other things, that the rankings tend to increase the cost of legal education. See MARTHA
DAUGHTREY ET AL., AM. BAR Ass'N, SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CoMMrrTEE ON THE U.S. News and World Report Rankings 3 (2010),
available at http://www.abanet.org/1egaled/nosearch/Council2010/OpenSession2010/
F.USNewsFinal%20Report.pdf; Macchiarola & Macchiarola, supra note 44.
96 See generally THOMAS E. BRENNAN & DON LEDuc, JUDGING THE LAW SCHOOLs (10th
ed. 2008) (using criteria such as size of student body, faculty size, and total law school square
footage to rank law schools). Rankings that incorporate both "input" and "output" criteria do
not typically confine such criteria into a single ranking rubric. See, e.g., Brian Leiter's Newest
Rankings, BRIAN LEITER'S L. ScH. RANKINGS, http://www.leiterrankings.com/new/index.shtml
(last visited Sept. 7, 2010) (devising separate rankings for schools based on scholarly impact,
student LSAT score, and Supreme Court clerkship placement, among other factors). Rankings
based entirely on "output" criteria have ranged from practical to absurd. See, e.g., Anthony
Ciolli, The Legal Employment Market: Determinants of Elite Firm Placement and How Law
Schools Stack Up, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 413 (2005) (using placement of law school graduates in
elite firms as a means of ranking law schools); Elie Mystal, Cornell Law Ranked #4 by Cornell
Student Who Reads Above the Law, ABOVE L. (May 24, 2010, 10:50 AM), http://abovethe-
law.com/2010/05/comell-law-ranked-4-by-comell-student-who-reads-above-the-law/ (report-
ing on a "reputational ranking" of certain law schools based on online legal tabloid stories).
97 See Marjorie M. Schultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Identification, Development, and Valida-
tion of Predictors for Successful Lawyering 86 n. 11 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1353554; see also Pamela Edwards, The Shell Game:
Who Is Responsible for the Overuse of the LSAT in Law School Admissions?, 80 ST. JoHN's L.
REV. 153, 156-57 (2006) (analyzing the LSAT's effect on law school rankings).
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to reputational and input criteria is data about outcomes."98 Thus far,
however, a reliable outcomes-based system of measurement has failed to
win general acceptance,99 and, value-added measures comparing out-
comes to inputs have also proven elusive.100
In addition to issues surrounding the U.S. News methodology, the
very presence of the rankings has launched an expensive tournament
among law schools to climb the ladder. 01 The rankings have en-
couraged a "teaching to the test" type of environment, in which schools
attend to the qualities that the magazine values in its scheme. 102 This
fidelity to the U.S. News-prescribed version of quality has shunned a
more nuanced, client-centered definition of value. 03 While difficult to
prove, there is anecdotal evidence that the "positional arms race" 10o be-
tween the law schools, fueled by the U.S. News' unitary ranking method-
ology, has driven lower and mid-tier law schools to imitate their top-tier
contemporaries. 0 5  As one law school dean described the rankings'
effect:
We compete on U.S. News & World Report's terms-
offering more high-end and fewer need-based scholar-
98 LUKE MYERS & JONATHAN ROBE, CTR. FOR COLL. AFFORDABILITY AND PRODUCTIV-
ITY, COLLEGE RANKINGS: HISTORY, CRITICISM AND REFORM 27 (2009) ("Few, if any, other
goods are judged by the strengths of the inputs used in their creation rather than the strength of
the final output.").
99 See id. (offering the subjective nature of such measurements and the "time-lag" prob-
lem as two possible explanations). If recent efforts toward a more transparent reporting of
student outcomes offer any indication, law schools do not seem entirely interested in a search
for objective truth. See Elie Mystal, Most Schools Would Like Law School Transparency to
Just Go Away, Above L. (Sept. 14, 2010, 2:16 P.M.), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/09/most-
schools-would-like-law-school-transparency-to-just-go-away/.
tOn See MYERS & ROBE, supra note 98, at 27.
lot Another important critique, beyond the scope of this Article, concerns the role of the
rankings in encouraging schools to rely too heavily on the LSAT in the admissions process, to
the disadvantage of minority applicants. For an outstanding article addressing the lack of
diversity in the legal profession generally, see Michelle J. Anderson, Legal Education Reform,
Diversity and Access to Justice, 61 RUTG. L. REv. 1011 (2009).
102 Cass, supra note 93, at 575 (noting that the rankings encourage "all schools to com-
pete along the same lines, to stress the same qualities"); see also GAO, COST AND ACCESS,
supra note 25, at 7 (suggesting that "competition among schools for higher rankings" is among
the main culprits driving law school costs).
103 See Matasar, Academic Fiduciary, supra note 90, at 87 (suggesting the need for "dis-
aggregating our measures of schools of high prestige with high inputs from those who take
students more at risk").
104 Gene Nichol, Educating for Privilege, NATION, Oct. 13, 2003, at 22, available at http:/
/www.thenation.com/doc/20031013/nichol.
105 Cf William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by
LSAT Scores: Migration Patterns in the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L.J. 163, 168 (2006)
[hereinafter Henderson, Migration Patterns] (describing U.S. News' unitary ranking as the
"800-pound gorilla of legal education"). Although the Authors are still gathering the data,
they are eager to uncover whether tuitions at lower-tier schools have, in fact, increased at a
faster rate than at their more highly ranked counterparts.
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ships; paying extraordinary salaries to star faculty and
deans; spending huge sums on facilities, technology and
brochures bragging about our accomplishments-raising
the price of education for everyone.106
The U.S. News rankings are not without their benefits, however.
While few can argue credibly that the magazine accurately measures
what law students and employers seek-the quality of a legal educa-
tion-"the fact that the ranking is imperfect, imprecise, or just plain bad
is not enough to jettison its use."10 7 As Professors Baker, Choi, and Gu-
lati have observed:
If the ranking forces revelation of otherwise hard-to-ob-
tain information about law schools, the objective ranking
has value. In other words, the question is not whether
the U.S. News rankings measure the quality of a legal
education, but whether U.S. News' ranking process has
important information-forcing attributes.10 8
Another defense of the magazine's approach has been advanced by
Professor Korobkin:
"High Quality" students . . . need a way to signal their
quality to employers that cannot be imitated by "lower
quality" students. They do this by responding to the
rankings. By choosing a school with a high ranking, the
student sends an important signal to future employers: he
is brainy or clever enough to be accepted by a more se-
lective school. 109
Faced with the classic prisoner's dilemma, few schools have done
much productive to escape the rankings' consequence. Instead, the U.S.
News rankings and the ABA accreditation process have become close
106 Nichol, supra note 104, at 22.
107 Baker et al., supra note 91, at 78 (footnote omitted).
108 Id. (noting that, prior to the U.S. News rankings, schools did not share information
"about faculty scholarship and hiring, the bar-passage rate and employment status of recent
graduates, the number of books in their libraries, or student-faculty ratios"); see also MYERS &
ROBE, supra note 98, at 22 (asserting that the rankings might result, in large part, from the
unwillingness of higher education "to put forward its own system of evaluating quality that
was relevant or intelligible to consumers"); cf Carey, supra note 5 (decrying the lack of "ob-
jective, publicly available information about how well colleges teach and how much college
students learn").
109 Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and
Collective Action Problems, 77 TEx. L. REv. 403, 409 (1998). Professor Korobkin admits that
critics of the rankings are "no doubt correct" when they argue that the rankings fail "to re-
present fairly the quality of education provided by the ranked institutions," though this criti-
cism is irrelevant in his view because the purpose of the rankings is not to measure academic
quality, but instead to coordinate law student job placement. See id. at 404.
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cousins. While each has marginally improved the information sharing in
the law school market, any benefit has come at great cost. Their effects
on the campus cannot be decoupled; each has been instrumental in en-
couraging schools to undertake costs aimed at satisfying a false idol.
Law schools responding to the tastes of the ABA accreditation process or
the U.S. News rankings have their eye on the wrong ball; they expend
their energy promoting a homogeneous law school experience, while
casting innovation and customer service aside. In the end,
[N]orms of uniformity and standardization have domi-
nated the world of legal education, substantially limiting
law schools' ability to compete against one another ....
Given this framework of comprehensive rules and regu-
lations, no law school has been able to pursue radical
innovations without jeopardizing its accreditation, its
reputation, and its future. In a world of highly con-
strained competition, schools have few ways to improve
their standing through strategies that upset the prevailing
wisdom about how best to deliver legal education. As a
result, law school rankings largely remain stable over
time, and different methods of ranking overall quality
yield similar results. With full-bodied competition
curbed by the accreditation process, schools rely on
gaming to influence the U.S. News rankings rather than
strike out in novel directions to gain prominence. 110
3. The Peculiar Incentives of the Law School Faculty
While the myriad factors described above have encouraged the run-
away costs at America's law schools, the fact that the schools themselves
have had little incentive to tap on the brakes is too often ignored. As
former Harvard President Derek Bok wrote, "Universities share one
characteristic with compulsive gamblers and exiled royalty: there is
never enough money to satisfy their desires.""' The law school resem-
bles its university parent with a "variety of peculiar and unappreciated
financial and political incentives." 1 2 Building on the earlier efforts of
110 Moran, supra note 63, at 383 (emphasis added). See also Nancy B. Rapoport, Eating
Our Cake and Having It, Too: Why Real Change Is so Difficult in Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J.
359, 366 (2006) ("Part of the reason law schools don't try to stand out from the pack is that
they can't. The tight regulation that comes from the ABA Standards and university accredita-
tion standards sets outside limits on experimentation.").
III DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 9 (2003).
112 Cohen, supra note 1, at 29.
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Professors George Shepherd and William Shepherd," 3 Professor Co-
hen's appropriately titled Comments on the Legal Education Cartel ex-
amines the incentive structure that underpins the decision making in the
world of legal education. His article highlights the complicity of law
school faculties in encouraging the runaway costs that threaten to swal-
low a generation of those they have chosen to educate. After establish-
ing that law schools are (i) generally nonprofits, (ii) in effect owned "by
a faculty whose claim lasts only as long as their employment and [can-
not] be alienated,"114 and (iii) "governed as large equalitarian partner-
ships of the tenured and tenure track professors,"' 15 Professor Cohen
compares their structure to that of the worker-owned firms in the former
Yugoslavia:
Because the workers (faculty) can not take their share of
the capital value of the firm with them when they leave,
and their retirement wealth is usually held by third par-
ties such as TIAA-CREF, they have little or no interest
in constraining costs and accumulating a surplus. The
greater their mobility, and the nearer they are to retire-
ment, the less their concern. Their interest is-subject to
not killing the golden goose-to take out as much of the
capital as possible for themselves over the course of
their career. As far as the faculty is concerned the two
most important attributes of senior administration is their
ability to raise money, euphemistically referred to as
'development'-and their willingness to dole it out to
them."16
The peculiar structure of the law school faculty and its governance
ensure that the law schools have ample incentive to limit the services
provided to law students "thereby allowing more of the revenues to be
extracted as rents instead of dissipated as costs."' 17 Several tangible
manifestations of this notion exist on the nation's law school campuses.
First, senior faculty salaries have risen far faster than the rate of inflation
It3 Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 28, at 2095 (concluding that the ABA "has exerted
monopoly power not only over the market for legal training, but also over three related mar-
kets: the market for the hiring of law faculty, the market for legal services, and each univer-
sity's internal market for funding").
114 Cohen, supra note 1, at 29.
115 Id.
116 Cohen, supra note 1, at 33; see also Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 28, at 2096
(observing that "faculty control the law schools, and, consciously or not, they operate them to
maximize benefits for faculty").
117 Cohen, supra note 1, at 28.
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over the past three decades. 18 Second, aside from earning more money,
teaching loads for law professors have continued to decline.' 19 Thirty
years ago law professors commonly taught six or more courses per year;
today, they are more likely to teach two courses in one semester and one
course in the other.120 More troubling is the evidence that "courses are
tilted to what faculty members want to teach, not to what students
need."121 Finally, in recent years, many law schools have also added to
their comforts by increasing the numbers and salaries of administrators
and spending lavishly on technology and physical facilities.122
While the benefits to the student body of a new building or im-
proved clinical programs can often be touted by the schools and their
faculties, the costs are often far better disguised: washed through a com-
plicated system of financing and subsidies 123 that, too often, leaves the
students holding the bag with increasing levels of debt that they have not
yet fully appreciated. Underpinning this entire edifice, it is the govern-
ment (i.e. the taxpayer) that bears the risk of student default.124 If we
hope to preserve accessible legal education, a better response to faculty
118 Schwarzschild, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that law professors now earn approximately
double that of the average college and university professor generally).
119 A particularly grotesque perversion takes place in the dispensing of teaching loads
(under the guise of "productivity" no less). Professor Cohen describes it as follows:
Then there is the question of "productivity." In the normal profit maximizing firm
there is a reasonably clear understanding of the meaning of the term. The value of
the marginal product of an input is the marginal product of the input times the price
at which the output is sold: number of additional widgets times price per widget.
But in the academic world in general, though the word productivity is much used, its
referent is something else entirely. It certainly does not mean number of students
taught or quality of teaching. Indeed, in the corrupt language of law school it is
those faculty members who are deemed least "productive" who are condemned to do
the most teaching.
Cohen, supra note 1, at 40.
120 Schwarzschild, supra note 11, at 6.
121 Matasar, Academic Fiduciary, supra note 90, at 71; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Law
School Faculty as Free Agents, 17 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 213, 230 (2008) ("[T]hose
[faculty members] who wish to exploit free agency will invest more time in visible scholarship
that is highly valued by the hiring school, and less time in improving low visibility institutional
service or teaching that is undervalued by the hiring faculty."); Newton, supra note 77 (noting
that law schools tend to hire and promote "tenure-track faculty members whose primary mis-
sion is to produce theoretical, increasingly interdisciplinary scholarship for law reviews rather
than prepare students to practice law").
122 Schwartzschild, supra note 11, at 6; see also Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from
Ambition to Greed to Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money and Professional Integrity, 30 HoFSTRA L.
REv. 879, 886 (2002) (observing that many law schools have moved from "relatively modest
buildings to elegant, spacious, expensive, well-designed structures"); Barone, supra note 3
("People are beginning to note that administrative bloat, so common in government, seems
especially egregious in colleges and universities.").
123 See discussion infra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
124 See discussion infra notes 161-76 and accompanying text.
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capture must begin to take shape. Customer-centered notions must be
better developed and must better account for costs.
In sum, a "keeping up with the Joneses" mentality has been burning
for some time across the legal academy. If each law school is a stick, the
introduction and development of ABA accreditation process bundled the
sticks, the U.S. News rankings lit the match, and the perverse set of
faculty incentives have made for more than adequate kindling. As the
next sub-Part explains, the federal government's expansive loan guaran-
tee and finance programs have poured an ample supply of lighter fluid
atop the fire! 1 2 5
4. The Federal Government and the Student Loan Market
i. The Scope of Government Involvement
The federal government's role in fueling the student loan market has
functioned as the perfect complement to the legal education cartel. It
serves too as a splendid reminder of the idea that, while economic policy
is the politicians' handiwork, good politics often makes bad econom-
ics. 12 6 Largely as a result of the efforts of the federal government, law
students are left with little choice but to involve themselves in a convo-
luted and confusing financing system that few can explain, and even
fewer can defend.12 7
Until recently, the federal government supported the student loan
market through two major program types: the Federal Family Education
Loan (FFEL) Program1 28 and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
125 One commentator has offered the following description of the federal government's
efforts to promote access without imposing meritocratic conditions and its dramatic effects at
the undergraduate level, which unfortunately, remains recognizable at the law school level:
Thus, federal aid to college students removed most financial barriers to attending
college. Applications increased as high school students heard the message that col-
lege attendance led to well-paid, interesting careers, and was now affordable. Many
colleges expanded facilities and lowered academic standards for admission; virtually
any high school graduate could get into some college. Students might have had an
incentive to work harder in high school if they had had to demonstrate academic
achievement both to gain admission to college and to obtain financial aid to cover
expenses while enrolled. The unintended consequence of failing to set this require-
ment is students graduating from college without good job prospects, a problem
made worse in an economy where the unemployment rate has now risen above 10
percent. The predictable result is a growing rate of student loan defaults.
Toby, supra note 14.
126 See ALAN S. BLINDER, HARD HEADS Sorr HEARTS: TOUGH-MINDED ECONOMICS FOR
A JUST SocETY 3 (1987).
127 See Allen, supra note 14 (asking "wouldn't it have been nice if the federal government
had never tried to intervene in higher education-financing in the first place?").
128 Federally guaranteed loans were first authorized in Part B of Title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (HEA). For many years, these were termed "Guaranteed Student
Loans." The Higher Education Amendments of 1992 renamed the guaranteed student loan
programs the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program.
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(Direct Loan) Program.12 9 Following the recent adoption of portions of
the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2009 (SAFRA), 3 o
loans under the FFEL Program will no longer be made after June 30,
2010, with the Direct Loan Program remaining in place and becoming
the primary government program.13 1 Historically, the government's ef-
forts have been aimed at providing students with financing for higher
education at better terms than those available in the private loan market.
Loans offered under the federal programs have had the same eligibility
rules and the same annual and aggregate maximum amounts. 13 2
Traditionally, the primary difference between the FFEL and Direct
Loan Programs was in the source of funds available for borrowers.13 3
Direct Loans come from the federal government coffers; 134 loans that
were made through the FFEL Program were provided by nonprofit and
129 The Student Loan Reform Act of 1993 authorized the Direct Loan Program, which is
now Part D of the Higher Education Act. See Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087a (2006). Other loan programs, such as the Perkins Loan Program, are made under
separate administrative structures. For a display of the relative sizes of each of the programs
as of 2008, see infra Appendix Figure 9.
130 H.R. 3221, 111th Congress (2009-2010). For a more detailed exploration of SAFRA,
See discussion infra at notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
131 See CASSANDRIA DORTCH, DAVID P. SMOLE & SHANNON M. MAHAN, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERv., THE SAFRA Acr: EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN FY2010 BUDGET RECONCILIA-
TION 1 (2010) [hereinafter DORTCH ET AL., SAFRA BUDGET RECONCILIATION]. The
government also offers aid through the tax code. The Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits
provide a benefit to families who paid tuition and have a tax liability. In addition, there are a
number of tax benefits in connection with college savings plans. See LONG ET AL., supra note
10, at 82 (describing the various federal tax incentives).
132 See Stafford Loans (FFELs and Direct Loans), FED. STUDENT AID, http://
studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/studentloans.jsp (last visited Aug. 21,
2010) [hereinafter Stafford Loans Website]. The federal government also administers Perkins
Loans, but that Program is comparatively small and beyond the scope of this Article. See also
Allen, supra note 14 (describing the FFEL Program as "designed to make higher education
more attainable and affordable to larger numbers of Americans" by encouraging private lend-
ers "to extend credit for college to a cohort of society that would otherwise not qualify for
loans").
133 Education Department data show that 4,463 postsecondary schools participated in the
public-private programs of FFEL in the 2008-2009 academic year, accounting for the creation
of $74 billion in loans. See Nick Anderson, Bill Would End U.S. Subsidy for Lenders of
College Aid, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/09/16/AR2009091603001.html. The direct lending regime, by contrast, had 1,742
participating schools in the same span, with $22 billion in loan volume. See id.; see also Cole
Robertson, The Student Loan Bailout, NATION, Jan. 12, 2009, http://www.thenation.com/arti-
cle/student-loan-bailout (attributing $52 billion and $12 billion in loans, respectively, to the
FFEL and Direct Loan Programs in 2007).
134 DORTCH ET AL., SAFRA BUDGET RECONCILIATION, supra note 131, at 6-7 ("Under
the DL [P]rogram, the federal government essentialiy serves as the banker and makes loans to
students and their families using federal capital (i.e., funds from the U.S. Treasury), and owns
the loans.").
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for-profit lenders, such as Sallie Mae, 135 and were insured by guaranty
agencies and subsequently reinsured by the federal government. 136
Together, the FFEL and the Direct Loan Programs have made the
federal government central to the system of higher education financing.
And while the government offers several loan options to student borrow-
ers,137 the loans are made with little care for the quality of educational
135 According to its website, Sallie Mae manages $182 billion in education loans and
serves ten million student and parent customers. See About Us, SALLE MAE, Salliemae.com/
about/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2010).
136 See Stafford Loans Website, supra note 132. The rationale for the FFEL loans was
that the federal guaranty replaced the collateral typically required for long-term loans from
banks and financial institutions. Several thousand financial institutions participated in the
FFEL Program. In recent years, some schools even opted to become lenders in the FFEL
Program. See id.
137 The following four types of loans were traditionally available through both the Direct
Loan and FFEL Programs (and today remain within the Direct Loan Program):
Subsidized Stafford Loans are awarded to students who demonstrate financial need ac-
cording to the Program's qualifications. Interest rates are fixed and interest does not accrue
while borrowers are enrolled in school at least half-time and during certain pre-described peri-
ods of "grace" and "deferment." Instead, the U.S. Department of Education subsidizes the
interest. See Stafford Loans Website, supra note 132. Independent graduate students can
qualify for subsidized Stafford loans if they meet financial eligibility requirements, and can
borrow up to $20,500 each year. See id. (noting that "[w]hen you graduate with a graduate or
professional degree, the maximum total debt allowed from Stafford Loans is $138,500"). A
borrower unable to qualify based on need for a subsidized Stafford Loan may apply for an
unsubsidized Stafford Loan, which is not based on need. See id.
Unsubsidized Stafford Loans are awarded to students regardless of financial need. Bor-
rowers are responsible for paying the interest that accrues under these loans, including during
any period that might otherwise qualify as a grace or deferment period under a Subsidized
Stafford Loan. Independent students and students whose parents cannot obtain a PLUS Loan
have higher unsubsidized loan limits under this Program. See id.
PLUS Loans for Graduate and Professional Degree Students (Grad PLUS) are designed
for borrowers who have exhausted their Stafford Loan eligibility. Under the Grad PLUS Pro-
gram, graduate students can borrow an amount up to the cost of school attendance-including
tuition, housing, and other expenses. Grad PLUS Loans, therefore, are not subject to a specific
dollar limit like Stafford Loans. Grad PLUS Loans carry a fixed interest rate. Borrowers must
generally repay their loans within ten years and, as with Unsubsidized Stafford Loans, remain
responsible for the lifetime interest that accrues on the loans. See PLUS Loans for Graduate
and Professional Degree Students, FED. STUDENT Am, http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTAL-
SWebApp/students/english/PlusLoansGradProfstudents.jsp (last visited Aug. 21, 2010) [here-
inafter Grad PLUS Loans Website].
Consolidation Loans allow a borrower to combine one or more federal education loans
into a single loan to facilitate repayment. Available after a borrower leaves school, Consolida-
tion Loans generally offer extended repayment terms depending upon the total value of the
underlying loans being consolidated. See Loan Consolidation, FED. STUDEwr Am, http://
studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/consolidation.jsp?tab=Repaying (last
visited Aug. 21, 2010). Because the repayment period is longer, consolidation loans may
reduce the borrower's monthly payments; however, the total interest repaid over the life of the
loan is usually higher. The interest rate on a Consolidated Loan is fixed, and is set at the
weighted average of the interest rates on the underlying loans. The process of consolidating
loans usually does not directly involve the school-as the consolidating lender purchases qual-
ifying student loans from other lenders. See id. Passage of SAFRA will not affect consolida-
tion in the short term; "[t]he SAFRA Act amends the eligibility requirements for certain
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institutions and their programs.' 3 8 Moreover, federal policies have failed
to examine the appropriateness of particular proposed courses of study
for individual students given their unique level of preparedness, ambi-
tions, and other factors. 139 By encouraging loans in place of grants, for
instance, the federal govermment has embraced a universal and inclusive
approach in place of the prior system that rewarded achievement and
academic record in dispensing government bounty.140 Of course, the
federal omnipresence in the student loan market means that the govern-
ment ultimately bears much of the risk of student loans. 141
Under the FFEL Program, for example, banks and other lenders
were provided two separate subsidies for originating federal student
loans: a guarantee against default losses, 142 and a taxpayer-subsidized,
guaranteed rate of return.143 As if these protections were not enough
government involvement, the government, at the time of the FFEL's
elimination, subsidized some thirty-four different guaranty agencies to
perform specific administrative activities for the FFEL Program.144 To-
borrowers to obtain DL Program Consolidation Loans during the period from July 1, 2010 to
June 30, 2011." DORTCH ET AL., SAFRA BUDGET RECONCILIATION, supra note 131, at 9.
138 But see infra Part I.B.4.iv.
139 See GILLEN, supra note 9, at 8-10.
140 See Toby, supra note 14 (arguing that the unintended consequence of failing to set any
real entry requirements is students graduating without good job prospects, leading to a growing
rate of student loan defaults).
141 See, e.g., Eisman, Subprime Goes to College, supra note 9, at slide 27 (noting that "the
government, the students and the taxpayer bear all the risk and the for-profit industry reaps all
the rewards").
142 For example, if a borrower defaults on a FFEL loan, the government pays the lender
ninety-seven percent of the outstanding principal and all of the accrued unpaid interest, while
the lender assumes default risk for only the remaining three percent of the loan principal. See
Federal Student Loan Subsidies, FED. EDUC. BUDGET PROJECT, http://febp.newamerica.net/
background-analysis/federal-student-loan-subsidies (last visited Aug. 21, 2010) [hereinafter
Federal Loan Subsidies]. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), with
outstanding FFEL volume totaling $413 billion, government payments to lenders for defaulted
loans totaled $8.5 billion in fiscal year 2008. See id.
143 The government paid FFEL lenders a Special Allowance Payment (SAP), to ensure
the lender a guaranteed interest rate on its loans. See Federal Loan Subsidies, supra note 142.
The SAP was equal to difference between the fixed interest rate charged on the loan, on the
one hand, and the three-month commercial paper interest rate plus a spread, on the other. See
id. The SAP subsidy structure effectively insulated the lender from interest rate fluctuations
over the course of the loan that would otherwise make the interest rate paid by the borrower
unattractive, and represented a risk-shifting mechanism that ensured that the government bore
the interest rate risk accompanying the loan.
144 These guaranty agencies are charged with preventing student loans from going into
default, collecting on defaulted loans, and carrying out other administrative roles. See Federal
Loan Subsidies, supra note 142. The presence of these guaranty agencies was more historical
accident than anything else; they represented the legacy of the failed state-centered federal
loan program that Congress originally envisioned. For an excellent description of the history
of the guaranty agencies and the record of lack of foresight and misunderstood incentives that
has characterized their history, see Federal Student Loan Guaranty Agencies, FED. EDUC.
BUDGET PRoJEcT, http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-guar-
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day, when an existing FFEL Program loan defaults,145 guaranty agencies
are responsible for administering the default guarantee by paying the fed-
erally-guaranteed amount to the lender.14 6 The guaranty agencies, in
turn, are "re-insured" by the federal government, as the Department of
Education reimburses the agencies for most or all default payments made
to FFEL lenders.14 7 Furthermore, the agencies receive a number of sub-
sidies from the federal government in connection with their role in the
FFEL Programl 48 and are permitted to retain sixteen percent of any suc-
cessful collections on defaulted loans. 149
Given the government's willingness to undertake both the risk of
student default and the administrative expenses, it is not hard to imagine
that private lenders had little reason to question either the creditworthi-
ness or future earnings prospects of a borrower.' 50 In fact, the only limit
to student borrowing in the old FFEL system appears to have been edu-
cational costs and the student's own judgment. Therefore, this structure
unfortunately placed the bulk of the borrowing decision on the party least
equipped to make an accurate value judgment regarding educational op-
tions and costs: the student-frequently a young, inexperienced, one-
time participant in the higher education market.' 5
ii. Crisis in the Market and the Emergence of SAFRA
As the credit crisis cascaded through the United States economy in
late 2007, cracks began to show in the student loan market.152 Loan
anty-agencies (last visited Jan. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Guaranty Agencies]. See also Toby,
supra note 14 (noting that "It]he student financial aid system was created by Congress not as
an integrated system but in pieces: to do a variety of things for a variety of reasons").
145 Although the FFEL Program no longer originates loans, its existing loans remain. See
CASSANDRIA DORTCH, DAVID P. SMOLE & SHANNON M. MAHAN, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV.,
THE SAFRA Acr: EDUCATION RECONCILIATION IN THE 111TH CONGRESs 6 (2010) [hereinafter
DORTCH ET AL., SAFRA EDUCATION RECONCILIATIONI.
146 See Federal Loan Subsidies, supra note 142.
147 See 34 C.F.R. § 682.404 (2009); GILLEN, supra note 9, at 9.
148 These include a "loan processing and issuance fee," an "account maintenance fee,"
and a "default aversion fee," each calculated as a percentage of the loan principal. See Federal
Loan Subsidies, supra note 142.
149 The OMB has pointed out that "federal payments to guaranty agencies totaled $877
million in fiscal year 2007." Id.
150 It also does not take much imagination to see how this incentive structure resembles
the structure in the mortgage market prior to the recent housing crash. If the mortgage origina-
tor retained little or no risk in the mortgage, his attention to diligence suffered. Here too, it is
wishful thinking to believe that a lender bearing only three percent of the default risk will be as
attentive as might be hoped. See GILLEN, supra note 9, at 9; Pinto, supra note 26.
151 See infra Part III.A.
152 See, e.g., Associated Press, Credit Jitters Spread to Student Loan Market, MsNBC.COM
(Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22188558/ns/business-personal-finance/ (cit-
ing rising student loan delinquencies and signs of a slowing demand for securitized student
loans); Robertson, supra note 133 (offering that the market for student loans "has also been
feeling the effects of the ongoing recession").
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origination lagged as lenders were faced with incredible uncertainty re-
sulting from the turmoil in the financial markets on the one hand, and
corresponding reductions in lender subsidies under the College Cost Re-
duction and Access Act of 2007153 on the other.154 With lenders exper-
iencing difficulty in raising capital to continue to originate FFEL
Program loans,155 the federal government moved to buoy the sagging
private loan market. In May of 2008, Congress passed the Ensuring
Continued Access to Student Loans Act (ECASLA).1 56 ECASLA was a
"private market financing" vehicle designed to provide up to $6.5 billion
of capital directly to the market's private lenders. Effectively, the Pro-
gram created a secondary market for the loans by providing the U.S.
Department of Education with temporary authority to purchase federally-
backed student loans made by private lenders.'57 Congress opted to
leave the new purchase authority largely undefined in the statute, giving
the Department of Education considerable discretion over its design and
administration.158 According to Department of Education estimates, ap-
proximately eighty percent of the new FFEL Program loans in fiscal year
2009 were financed through ECASLA programs.' 5 9 Despite the govern-
ment's efforts, many schools voluntarily switched to the Direct Loan
Program in response to the political and economic uncertainties that con-
tinued to swirl around the FFEL Program.16 0
Faced with this continuing economic maelstrom threatening the
long-term viability of the student loan market, the Obama Administration
pushed SAFRA through the House of Representatives in September
2009.161 While the bill languished in the Senate for several months, cer-
153 20 U.S.C.A. § 1070a (West 2006).
154 See GILLEN, supra note 9, at 20 (noting that the Act "cut rates for loans made after
June 2006 from the current 6.8[%]" down to 6.0%). This "will certainly benefit recent college
graduates but will not help future students, as it will encourage schools to raise their tuition
even more." Id.
155 See JASON DELISLE, NEw Am. FOUND., STUDENT LOAN PURCHASE PROGRAMS UNDER
THE ENSURING CONTINUED ACCESS TO STUDENT LOANS Acr OF 2008 1 (2009).
156 20 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 2010).
157 Stephen Burd, Obama's Bold Proposal, HIGHER ED WATCH BLOG, (Feb. 26, 2009,
3:58 PM), http://www.newamerica.net/blog/higher-ed-watch/2009/obamas-bold-proposal-
10376 (arguing that ECASLA was a product of the fact that "credit market disruptions [had]
made the FFEL Program untenable").
158 Thus far, the Department of Education has created four separate loan purchase ar-
rangements under ECASLA: a put option, a short-term purchase program, a financing arrange-
ment, and an asset-backed commercial paper support program. See DELISLE, supra note 155,
at 2 (describing the general terms of each of the programs).
159 See DORTCH ET AL., SAFRA BUDGET RECONCILIATION, supra note 131, at 6.
160 See DELISLE, supra note 155, at 2; Robertson, supra note 133 (noting that, between the
onset of the financial crisis and January 2009, at least 168 lenders dropped out of the FFEL
Program and almost 30% of schools using the FFEL Program contemplated a switch).
161 Despite opposition from conservative lawmakers and private bankers, H.R. 3221
passed in a 253-171 vote on September 17, 2009. Eliza Krigman, Student Loan Bill Passes in
House, NATIONALJOURNAL.COM (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/
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tain provisions of the bill were incorporated into H.R. 4872, and became
law as part of President Obama's health care overhaul embodied in the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA).162
Pursuant to the terms of HCERA, loans will no longer be originated
under the government-guaranteed FFEL Program, leaving the govern-
ment, through the Direct Program, the sole originator of federal loans.16 3
In essence, HCERA shifts student lending entirely into the hands of the
federal government, 64 which represents a stark difference from the na-
tion's most recent experience in which private institutions disbursed
roughly three-quarters of the student loans.165 By phasing out public
subsidies for lending by private institutions, HCERA does effectively
streamline some antiquated, duplicative and unnecessary portions of the
existing structure and should ultimately save some money for the federal
government.166 In the end, however, it does little to slow the debt-fueled
growth of tuitions and resulting student debt loads, and represents the
latest prize for the rent-seeking,167 higher education complex.
ed_20090916 2914.php (citing Rep. John Kline, R-Minn., as stating that "the bill [is] a 'job
killer' that will expand the deficit rather than reduce it"). For a fine description of the original
bill, see DAVID P. SMOLE ET AL., THE STUDENT Am AND FISCAL REsPONsILrY ACT OF 2009
(2009), available at OPEN CRS, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40742_20090731.pdf.
162 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (2010). On March 30, 2010, President Obama signed H.R. 4872 into law. See Peter
Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Signs Overhaul of Student Loan Program, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 31, 2010, at A14.
163 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act §§ 2201-08. See also Allen, supra
note 14 (noting that under President Obama's plan the "only role that private banks . . . would
continue to play in student lending would be to service some of the loans under contract").
The new law also employs inflation indices to increase the maximum Pell grant over the next
decade. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act § 2101 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1070a).
164 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act § 2205.
165 See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET SUMMARY 64 (2010), available
at http://www2.ed.gov/aboutloverview/budget/budgetl0/summary/l0summary.pdf
166 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COSTS AND POLICY OrrIONS FOR FEDERAL STUDENT
LOAN PROGRAMS 14 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/l lOxx/docl1043/03-25-
StudentLoans.pdf (projecting a net savings to the federal government of $62 billion in the
period from 2010 to 2020 by eliminating FFEL and relying exclusively on direct lending by
the Department of Education); DORTCH ET AL., SAFRA EDUCATION RECONCILIATION, supra
note 145, at 3-4.
167 In economics, so-called "rent seekers" look to transfer wealth rather than create it.
"Rent seeking" is a term "designed to describe behavior in institutional settings where individ-
ual efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus." JAMEs M.
BUCHANAN, RENT SEEKING AND PROFIrr SEEKING, in TowARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEK-
ING SOCIETY 3-4 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980). Rent-seeking behavior, therefore,
represents a waste of resources, whether the firm(s) "seeks an advantage for itself or is simply
trying to prevent others for obtaining an advantage at its expense." See STEPHEN J. SPURR,
EcONoMIc FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 26 (2006).
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iii. Income-Based Repayment and More of the Same
In July 2009, the Obama Administration introduced Income-Based
Repayment (IBR), a new payment option for federal student loans. 168
The Program represents the government's attempt to ease the burden of
student loan borrowers struggling with their repayment obligations. IBR
seeks to keep loan payments affordable for borrowers by imposing pay-
ment caps based on their income and family size.169 To enter the IBR
Program, a borrower must first have enough debt relative to income to
qualify for a reduced payment. 170 Then, for most eligible borrowers, the
Program uses a sliding scale to ensure that ongoing loan payments
amount to less than ten percent of a borrower's income.171 After twenty-
five years of qualifying payments, the government will forgive any re-
maining debt.172
On the one hand, the IBR Program marks a significant milestone in
that the government has begun to realize that thousands of students are
struggling mightily under the burden of a stifling debt load. On the other
hand, the cost of any student forgiveness under the Program is necessa-
rily borne by the government and, in turn, the taxpayer. Perhaps most
disappointing of all, the Obama Administration acknowledges a serious
problem-dramatic tuition inflation-yet fails to meaningfully address
its continued proliferation. In fact, by transferring some of the risk and
burden of student loans from individual students to American taxpayers,
the IBR Program may cause additional tuition inflation as more students
might be drawn to the academy, and existing students may be willing to
take on additional debt. Similar to other policy failings, most notably in
168 This Program built off of a similar initiative launched near the end of George W.
Bush's presidency: The College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84,
121 Stat. 784 (2007). IBR is now available to federal student loan borrowers in both the
Direct and FFEL loan Programs, and covers most types of federal loans made to students, but
is not available for loans made to parents.
169 For a description of the Program, see Income Based Repayment Plan, FED. STUDENT
AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/englishlIBRPlan.jsp (last visited
Jan 21, 2010).
170 The Program is available to borrowers who would have to pay more than 15% of their
earnings above 150% of the poverty level to pay off the loans under the standard 10-year loan
payment plan. See id. at 11.
171 See id. Under the plan, a borrower earning below 150% of the poverty level for her
family size will pay nothing. See id. (comparing loan payment amounts). A borrower earning
more will have her loan payment capped at 15% of earnings above that amount. Except for the
highest earners, the cap usually ensures that a borrower will pay less than 10% of total income
as debt service. See DORTCH ET AL., SAFRA BUDGET RECONCILIATION, supra note 131, at 11.
172 SAFRA amended the IBR plan for new borrowers of the Direct Loan Program after
July 1, 2014. According to the amendments, borrowers repaying according to the IBR plan
will have monthly payment amounts capped at ten percent of their discretionary income and
will be eligible to have any loan balance remaining unpaid after twenty years forgiven at that
time. See DORTCH ET AL., SAFRA BUDGET RECONCILIATION, supra note 131, at 1-2 (describ-
ing the new amendment).
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housing, the government's efforts fail to address the notion that an in-
vestment in education-like all other investments-must be subject to
measurement. 173
Although entrenched interests in the education industrial complex
are often hesitant to say it, education only offers a good investment
where its benefits dominate its costs.17 4 As the plight of more and more
law school graduates becomes evident, law students asking difficult
questions about both (i) the costs involved in embarking on a legal ca-
reer, and (ii) the benefits they are likely to enjoy from such a career, are
likely to be unimpressed by the answers. Ultimately, many in the educa-
tion industrial complex will be held to account. 175 Any rational solution
to the higher education crisis must begin with systems designed to pro-
vide value measures and make value judgments. The only remaining
question is whether the road to such a rational market will be orderly. 176
iv. "For-Profit" Schools and a Way Forward
At the time of this Article's writing, the United States Department
of Education was engaged in developing objective criteria for discerning
whether certain "for-profit" educational institutions should continue to
qualify for the provision of federal aid for their students.177 Under the
Higher Education Act of 1965, federal loans are to be made available to
programs that prepare students for "gainful employment in a recognized
173 Cohen, supra note 1, at 48 (calling the American legal academy a "strange beast" and
asserting that once we abandon a world of consumer sovereignty in favor of one where "pri-
vate parties use the state to enforce cartels all," the world "becomes convoluted and confus-
ing"); see also Bennett, supra note 14 (declaring that "[h]igher education is not underfunded.
It is under-accountable and under-productive.").
174 See, e.g., Schlunk, supra note 5, at 1-4; see also Matasar, Rise and Fall, supra note
17, at 490 ("By any calculation, if cost exceeds return, legal education is in for rocky times.");
cf James Vescovi, Why Does Law School Cost so Much?, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.
law.columbia.edullaw_school/conmunications/reports/summer06/lawschoolcost (last visited
Aug. 26, 2010) ("It seems clear that a degree from [Columbia] Law School is still viewed as
an investment with an excellent rate of return.").
175 See, e.g., Efrati, supra note 11 (observing that the majority of law school graduates are
suffering from a supply-and-demand imbalance that is suppressing pay and job growth).
176 See Morrissey, supra note 7, at 275 (suggesting that "the day may be fast approaching
when many would-be law students will be deterred from pursuing such a course of study by
the small financial return they can foresee from such a decision"); see also Schwarzschild,
supra note 11, at 9-10 ("Rising costs may at some point provoke resistance, if not rebellion,
among law students, their families, and the public in any event.").
177 See Justin Hamilton, Obama Administration Proposes Student Aid Rules to Protect
Borrowers and Taxpayers; Key Elements of Gainful Employment on a Second Track, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDuc., June 16, 2010, http://www.ed.gov/news/student-aid-rules-protect-borrowers-
and-taxpayers; see also Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Default Rate Is Continuing to Increase,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at Al5 (noting that "[tihe default rate on federal student loans
continued to rise last year, with the rate for students at for-profit colleges - already the
highest - rising the fastest").
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occupation."s7 8  The Department's most recent "gainful employment"
proposal would require for-profit schools that receive federal student
loans "to show that former students are repaying their loans or are capa-
ble of doing S0."179 Under the proposal, for-profit schools would fully
qualify to provide federal aid to students if either (i) greater than forty-
five percent of former students are paying off the principal on loans, or
(ii) the debt burden of former students is below eight percent of total
income, or below twenty percent of discretionary income. 8 0
The Department's recent efforts are to be applauded for the mere
fact that, in whatever form they ultimately take, they arise from the pre-
mise that the value of an education can be measured by some objective
standard. Much of the stifling debt that today's graduates struggle to
repay might have been avoided if education consumers simply under-
stood that education, like every other asset, has a measurable value.
Such a simple concession would likely have led to more realistic and
sober assessments at the time that education services were purchased. In
a sense, the for-profit segment represents the low hanging fruit in the
education sector: despite recent growth, it remains a rather small segment
of the overall higher education market with its student outcomes among
the industry's most disappointing.18 ' It is, therefore, discouraging that
the government's efforts have met such strong resistance.18 2
The new approach embodies much of the thinking that this Article
espouses, namely, the realization that the education-for-all and the at-all-
cost mentality that has characterized the higher education market for the
past two decades is meeting its demise. Whether such a mindset persists
is no longer a question of policy or politics. In the end, economics dic-
tates that the higher education market simply cannot withstand
178 Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1001(b)(1) (2006).
179 Emma Ashburn, For-Profit Schools Get Report on Loan Repayments, REUTERS, Aug.
13, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67D0620100814 (summarizing the De-
partment of Education's recent efforts, as well as the most recent data estimating student loan
repayment rates in the for-profit sector).
180 See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 56
Fed. Reg. 43616 (proposed July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668); see also Jen-
nifer Epstein, Closer Look at 'Gainful Employment,' INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 26, 2010), http://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/07/26/regs (last visited Aug. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Ep-
stein, Gainful Employment] (summarizing the proposed rule).
181 See Ashburn, supra note 179 (noting that enrollment in for-profit colleges was 1.8
million in 2008, representing 9% of all institutions that receive federal aid and up from
240,000 students, or 2% of those institutions in 1995). See also Following Federal Aid Dol-
lars, EDUC. PORTAL BLOG (Nov. 30, 2009), http://education-portal.com/articles/Follow-
ingFederal AidDollars.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2010) (summarizing the fact that a
growing portion of federal aid dollars are going to for-profit schools).
182 See, e.g., Jennifer Epstein, Resistance on Debt Proposal, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Jan. 26,
2010, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/01/26/employment [hereinafter Epstein, Re-
sistance] (describing forceful opposition of "[a] team of negotiators representing all sectors of
higher education").
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noneconomic decisions any longer.183 If the government proves success-
ful in slowing the funding mill for the for-profit sector, it will mark real
progress toward avoiding some of the most disappointing outcomes for
the next generation of education consumers. Unfortunately, however,
such efforts offer little consolation for those already confronting their
own disappointing reality. Moreover, in the coming years such efforts
will have to be redoubled, and aimed far wider than simply at the for-
profit segment of the market. 184
II. - THE DISAPPOINTING REVENUE PICTURE FOR LAW
SCHOOL GRADUATES
Viewing a legal career exclusively through the investment lens, the
decision whether to attend law school is rather simple to frame: will a
lawyer earn sufficient remuneration to repay the cost expended in the
endeavor? In finance parlance, an investment is said to make sense if it
provides for a positive net present value.185 To calculate the net present
value of an investment opportunity, the stream of cash flows likely to be
realized from the investment is compared to the investment's cost.18 6 In
the law school context, a student's costs are rather straightforward. Gen-
erally, they will include the money spent on tuition (including any inter-
est on debt service), room and board, books, and incidentals. Cost will
also include the "opportunity cost" of the earnings that a student will
forego during the three years of law school attendance.' 87 On the other
side of the ledger, the cash flows that a law school graduate will ulti-
mately realize over and above what she might have earned absent a law
degree are far from certain. Nonetheless, to determine the net present
value of her potential investment, a prospective law student is left to her
best forecast. Setting aside larger economic issues and the overall pros-
pects of the job market, which remain largely beyond the individual stu-
dent's control and are difficult to forecast reliably, expected earnings will
183 See, e.g., Eisman, Subprime Goes to College, supra note 9, at slide 47 (arguing that if
nothing is done to rein in this industry, "we are on the cusp of a new social disaster" with
estimated defaults of $275 billion over the next ten years).
184 See Letter from Michael B. Enzi, Ranking Member, S. Comm. On Health, Educ.,
Labor and Pensions, to Gene Dodaro, Acting Comptroller Gen., U.S. Gov't Accountability
Office 1-2 (Aug. 18, 2010) (on file with author) (suggesting that the Senate should investigate
the value proposition across a far wider swath of the education industry).
185 "Net present value" is normally defined by the present value of cash flows minus
investment. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERs & ALAN J. MARCUS, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 181 (5th ed. 2007).
186 Of course, adjustments are made to the stream of cash flows to account for their tim-
ing and the reinvestment opportunities available to the recipient.
187 See Schlunk, supra note 5, at 1-2 (observing that the costs of law school include "the
opportunity cost of not entering the workforce immediately after graduation from college, and
the out-of-pocket costs, primarily tuition, fees and books, inherent in attending law school").
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depend, in large measure, on the quality of the school that the student
attends and her rank within her law school class. A deeper look at the
prospects for the reasonably prudent, new lawyer reveals some troubling
trends.
After absorbing the opportunity cost of three years of lost employ-
ment opportunities, bearing a large amount of debt, working diligently
through three years of coursework and passing the bar exam (hopefully!),
what is the typical young lawyer likely to earn? In a recent paper, Pro-
fessor William Henderson observed a phenomenon that should give a
young lawyer pause. As Professor Henderson explains:
[T]he market for entry level lawyers currently has a bi-
modal distribution in which approximately 17% of law
school graduates are clustered at uniformly high starting
salaries. Yet, because of the cliff-like quality for jobs
below the right mode ($135,000 to $145,000 in 2006),
large numbers of law students who barely missed the on-
campus interview (OCI) grade cut-offs struggle to find
jobs in major markets that pay even 50% of the large
firm going rate.' 88
Examining the distributions of entry-level-legal salaries today
against the same data from fifteen years earlier reveals a drastic change
by which the market for starting lawyers has "entered new and com-
pletely uncharted waters." 89 According to the data of the National As-
sociation for Law Placement (NALP), approximately 40% of all entry-
level lawyers, in 1991, began their career with an annual salary between
$30,000 and $40,000, with just 6% of new lawyers earning the $70,000
median starting salary for large law firm associates that year.190 Thus,
the starting salaries distribution curve for the Class of 1991, while not a
normal bell shape, "bears some resemblance to one." 91
188 William D. Henderson, Are We Selling Results or Resumes?: The Unexplored Linkage
Between Human Resource Strategies and Firm-Specfic Capital 21 (Ind. Univ. Sch. of
Law-Bloomington, Working Paper Series No. 105, 2008) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter
Henderson, Results or Resumes?]. In 2010, the National Association of Law Placement re-
ported similar statistics: an adjusted average salary of slightly over $85,000, with most salaries
falling drastically to the right or the left of the curve. See Salary Distribution Curve for the
Class of 2009 Shows Relatively Few Salaries Were Close to the Mean, NAT'L Ass'N OF L.
PLACEMENT (July 2010), http://www.nalp.org/startingsalarydistributionclassof2009 (last vis-
ited Aug. 26, 2010).
189 Henderson, Results or Resumes?, supra note 188, at 9.
190 Salaries of New Lawyers: How Did We Get Here?, NAT'L Ass'N OF L. PLACEMENT
BULL. (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.nalp.org/2008jansalaries [hereinafter NALP, How
Did We Get Here?]. For a visual representation of this data, see infra Appendix Figure 1.
191 Henderson, Results or Resumes?, supra note 188, at 9.
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Throughout the 1990s, sharp salary increases at large firms gradu-
ally moved more starting lawyer salaries north of the $70,000 mark. 192
Despite the shift, "[T]he overall distribution maintained the basic, though
lopsided bell shape." 193 Salary distributions changed dramatically in
2000, as Internet euphoria buoyed the starting salaries at large firms to
$125,000.194 While the amount of the increase was dramatic, "[O]f more
consequence for the salary distribution was how widespread the increase
was."' 95 The result was, for the first time, the two peaks of a bimodal
distribution, 19 6 with nearly 14% of salaries reported at the $125,000 level
and 48% of the new lawyer salaries falling in the $30,000 to $50,000
range.197 Although a greater number of new lawyers continued to earn
salaries falling in the left mode ($30,000 to $50,000 range), "never
before had a single salary so dominated the landscape."198 By 2006, the
durability of the "obvious and dramatic stratification of the market for
new lawyers" was conspicuous, with 44% of new lawyers earning be-
tween $40,000 and $60,000 and 17% of new lawyers earning the
$135,000 or $145,000 starting salary common to "big law" practice.199
The distribution characteristics of entry-level-lawyer salaries
should have dramatic effects on the forecasting of a rational prospective
law student. As this Article discussed earlier, to determine the net pre-
sent value of the law school investment, a prospective student will need
to forecast expected cash flows (earnings) resulting from a legal career.
Before celebrating the substantial increase in starting salaries, a law stu-
dent should consider NALP's warning that "the costs of a legal education
have risen substantially faster than salaries, and these costs are an impor-
tant factor in understanding the bigger picture of our current market." 200
192 The median salary at firms of more than 250 lawyers, for instance, moved from
$72,000 in 1995 to over $90,000 in 1999. See NALP, How Did We Get Here?, supra note
190.
193 Id. For a visual representation of the 1996 version of the distribution, see infra Ap-
pendix Figure 2.
194 See NALP, How Did We Get Here?, supra note 190.
195 Id.
196 In statistics, a "bimodal distribution" typically describes a continuous probability dis-
tribution with two different modes. Bimodal distributions are commonly used as an example
of how deceptive summary statistics such as the mean, median, and standard deviation can be
when used on an arbitrary distribution.
197 See NALP, How Did We Get Here?, supra note 190.
198 Id. For a visual representation of this data, see infra Appendix Figure 3.
199 See NALP, How Did We Get Here?, supra note 190. For a visual representation of
this data, see infra Appendix Figure 4; see also David E. Van Zandt, Foundational Competen-
cies: Innovation in Legal Education, 61 RUTG. L. REv. 1127, 1129 (2009) (observing that the
legal market's "new realities have also forced a segmentation of law schools and their gradu-
ates along the dimension of the expected starting salaries of their alumni").
200 What Do New Lawyers Earn? A 15-Year Retrospective as Reported by Law School
Graduates, NAT'L Ass'N OF L. PLACEMENT BuLL. (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.
nalp.org/2007septnewlawyers.
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Moreover, the bimodal distribution that has come to characterize the
market should be of particular concern to a forecaster. Faced with such
distribution characteristics, the more traditional, popular, and crude tools
of modeling, including mean and median, become less reliable. Instead,
a good financial modeler should become keenly aware of the "all or
nothing quality" of the profile of future earnings created by the cliff ef-
fect of the bimodal distribution. While law schools and various rankings
attend to reporting the mean and median starting salaries of entry level
graduates, the costs of missing the cut off for the right hand mode can be
drastic when it comes to the ability to repay student loans. 2 0 1 This reality
becomes suffocating when one fully appreciates the dirty little secret that
the debt burden is the greatest for those least likely to make it to the right
mode because they were also the least likely to receive financial assis-
tance from the law school by virtue of a desirable U.S. News input. 2 0 2
And, on average, the earnings divide "between large and small firm pay
tends to widen during the first eight years of legal practice." 203 Thus, for
a student attempting to project likely earnings, mean and median might
offer a convenient excuse to assuage her that she stands a realistic chance
to make it out the other end of the debt roller-coaster. As a reliable,
objective measure of likely success, however, this data is woefully
insufficient.
Rather, the appropriate measure would be expected return which, in
this instance, would be represented by the product of expected salary
multiplied by the probability of earning that salary. If, for instance, a
student had a 40% chance of gaining employment offering a "right
mode" salary of $140,000 and a 60% chance of earning a "left mode"
salary of $50,000, her expected earnings would be equal to $86,000.204
Her actual return will likely vary rather significantly from the expected
return in this example, however, as the student is very likely to earn
something roughly 50% greater or less than her expected earnings num-
ber alone would suggest. Such an example highlights the limited utility
of the expected return measure in this context. It tells nothing about
variance. The reliability of that input, therefore, in a model of expected
earnings is tenuous, to say the least. 2 0 5
201 See, e.g., Crittenden, supra note 22, at 38 ("[S]tudents who rely on a school's median
or average[ ] may be disappointed when they graduate and land a job far below that.").
202 See Morrissey, supra note 7, at 269.
203 Henderson & Morriss, The New Math, supra note 13.
204 (40% * $140,000) + (60% * $50,000) = $86,000.
205 Bimodal distributions are a commonly used example of how summary statistics such
as the mean, median, and standard deviation can be deceptive when reflexively applied with-
out the benefit of context. In this example, while $86,000 represents the expected earnings
power of the graduating law student, it is not a typical value that the student is likely to earn.
The $62,000 median is also of limited utility. Instead, the characteristics of this distribution
for the law student take on an all-or-nothing type quality as a job offering the salary of the
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A glossy brochure with mean and median salaries of recent gradu-
ates-even if they can be relied on as accurate 206-Simply will not suf-
fice as adequate disclosure for an appropriately educated investor.207 As
Professors William Henderson and Andrew Morriss have plainly ob-
served, "[p]eople contemplating a $100,000 or more investment in their
careers need accurate information and to be able to compare how gradu-
ates with similar credentials at different schools fare in the job
market." 208
In the securities law context, for example, investors are generally
protected from offering documents that provide material misstatements
or omissions. 209 Further, securities industry leaders have argued that all
securities marketing materials should provide a balanced disclosure out-
lining the product's risks and rewards to an investor. 210 Certainly, law
school materials do not commonly include something akin to a risk fac-
tor warning that the law school and its faculty have a vested interest in
right mode offers the only solution to the debt burden riddle. As one blogger put it: "Let's
face it: $40K to $55K per year is just not enough to pay down the avg. $85,000 debt (espe-
cially as interest rates climb) and still enjoy any kind of lifestyle that a professional degree is
presumed to confer." Bill Henderson, Distribution of 2006 Starting Salaries: Best Graphic
Chart of the Year, EMPIRIcAL L. STUD. BLOG (Sept. 4, 2007), http://www.elsblog.org/the-
empirical_1egal-studi/2007/09/distribution-of.html [hereinafter Henderson, Salary
Distribution].
206 See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
207 See Cass, supra note 93, at 575 (bemoaning that "[t]he U.S. News methodology counts
a counter job at McDonald's the same as a prestigious judicial clerkship, an associate's posi-
tion at Covington & Burling or Skadden, Arps, or another highly prized, top-flight legal job").
208 Henderson & Morriss, supra note 13. See also Patrick J. Lynch & Kyle P. McEntee,
A Way Forward: Improving Transparency in Employment Reporting at American Law
Schools 7 (Apr. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
1528862 (arguing that the currently available tools "inadequately serve prospective students
striving to take a detailed, holistic look at the diverse employment opportunities at different
law schools").
209 This protection is provided in Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k(c), (e) (2006). In addition, Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act also provides an
express, private party cause of action for rescission of the sale of a security "by means of a
prospectus or oral communication" that includes a material misstatement or omission. See 15
U.S.C. § 771(2) (2006). Finally, the "reasonable basis" and "customer specific" standards of
suitability require a broker-dealer to investigate, refrain from making statements regarding
securities without an adequate basis, and only make recommendations in light of an individual
customer's specific financial situation and level of sophistication. For our favorite summary of
the protections afforded the customer in connection with the sale of securities, see Michael C.
Macchiarola, Securities Linked to the Performance of Tiger Woods? Not Such a Long Shot, 42
CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 59-69 (2008). See also Rule 10b-5 and Law Schools, ADAM SrTH,
ESQ. BLOG, (May 13, 2010), http://www.adamsmithesq.com/archives/2010/05/rule-I Ob-5-and-
law-schools.html (suggesting that law schools be required to make more robust disclosure as
part of a "lOb-5 Oath").
2t0 See NAT'L Assoc. OF SEc. DEALERS, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 03-71, NON-CONVEN-
TIONAL INVESTMENTS: NASD REMINDS MEMBERS OF OBLIGATIONS WHEN SELLING NON-CON-
VENTIONAL INVESTMENTS 765 (2003), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/
@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p003070.pdf.
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encouraging students to borrow large sums of money to enroll in the
incoming class. Upon inspection, it would not be surprising if some law
school sales materials failed to meet minimal consumer protection or fair
sales standards. 211
Aside from the structural bias embedded in law school pitchbooks,
the current Great Recession is likely to have a profound effect on the
attitudes of current and future law students. First, with big law firms in a
cutting or no-growth mode, the supply of the coveted "big law" jobs has
been limited 212 with students interviewing in 2009 "competing for half as
many jobs at top law firms . . . as last year."2 13 This has severely cur-
tailed the number of graduating law students "lucky enough" to grab a
coveted "big law" job.2 1 4 A law student counting on the starting salary
211 ABA Standard 509 requires law schools to publish "basic consumer information ... in
a fair and accurate manner" and ABA Standard 510 requires a law school to "take reasonable
steps to minimize student loan defaults." See AM. BAR Ass'N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL FOR LAW
SCHOOLS 2009-2010 5-6 (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/
20082009StandardsWebContent/Chapter%205.pdf [hereinafter ABA, LAW SCHOOL AP-
PROVAL, CHAPTER FIVE]. However, the Standards and the corresponding interpretations do
little to articulate any meaningful norm or signal any willingness on the part of the ABA to
diligently enforce the requirements.
In this regard, it would be interesting to see how the ABA chose to handle a situation
similar to the following hypothetical: Imagine a law school offering merit-based scholarships
to seventy percent of its first year students. The school informs the students that they will
retain the scholarship in their second year, provided they finish in the top half of the class. Is
the school required to provide students with disclosure (i) describing the total number (or
percentage) of other students receiving similar scholarships; or (ii) alerting the students to the
fact that some students receiving the first year scholarships will necessarily lose them in their
second year?
212 See Gerry Shih, Downturn Dims Prospects Even at Top Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2009, at BI (noting that "[t]his fall, law students are competing for half as many
openings at big firms as they were last year in what is shaping up to be the most wrenching job
search season in over 50 years"). For a summary of the depth of the layoffs, see The Layoff
List: by the Numbers, AM. LAW., http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=120243
0161161&TheLayoffListBy_theNumbers_ (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
213 ABA, VALUE PROPOSITION, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that "many members of the
class of 2010 and 2011 may graduate without a job, and those lucky enough to find employ-
ment likely will collectively have lower salaries than their predecessors").
214 See, e.g., Lynch & McEntee, supra note 208, at 3 (observing that "[tihe recent reces-
sion and corresponding reduction of traditionally high-paying entry-level jobs has exacerbated
the distance between the cost of a U.S. legal education and expected earnings as a lawyer").
"Fielding complaints from more and more unemployed graduates, frequently drowning in stu-
dent debt," schools have become ever more aggressive in their efforts to keep up appearances.
Catherine Rampell, In Law Schools, Grades Go Up, Just like That, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2010,
at Al. In fact, the most recent tactic employed by several law schools, in the estimation of one
former law school dean, "does damage to our expectation of the rule of law." Frank J. Mac-
chiarola, Make-Believe Grades for Real Law Students, MINDING THE CAMPUS (June 24, 2010),
http://www.mindingthecampus.com/originals/2010/06/makebelieve-grades forrealla.html.
In fact, some of the changes were employed retroactively in an effort to protect the schools'
"own reputations and rankings" and make "students look more attractive in a competitive job
market." Rampell, supra.
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that these jobs have brought in recent years might also be disappointed
by a reduction in the entry-level wage 215 or a deferral of the starting
date.216
Perhaps more damaging than the effects of the disappointment
brought by the current economic lassitude are the likely effects over the
longer term, if these changes turn out to be lasting. 217 In a sense, a per-
manent downward adjustment to the starting wage requires all rational
investors entering the legal education market to ratchet their after-tax
earnings expectations downward. 218 Absent a commensurate discount in
the form of a tuition reduction or other subsidy, the investment thesis of
the average prospective student is placed under additional strain.219 Pro-
fessor Schlunk summarizes the effect of such a scenario rather suc-
cinctly, offering that it "could easily tip the balance with respect to the
investment decision . . . decidedly into negative territory" 220 for more
and more students.
III. INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
A. Informational Asymmetries Abound221
The two sides of the legal education market stand in stark contrast.
On one side, the consumers of legal education are, on average, young, ill-
informed about legal education, and unsophisticated about the careers
and salaries that they are likely to enjoy following law school gradua-
215 G. M. Filisko, How Low Will Pay Go?, A.B.A. J. (June 1, 2009, 8:40 PM), http://
www.abajournal.conmagazine/how-low..wilLpay-goprint see also Schwarzschild, supra
note 11, at 8 (observing that there is "growing awareness that most law graduates earn far less
than the glamorous wages of associates at elite metropolitan law firms").
216 See, e.g., Bloomberg News, Cravath, a Top Law Firm, to Pay New Hires to Delay
Start, N.Y. TmEs, June 12, 2009, at B2.
217 See Larry Ribstein, The Death of Big Law 21 (Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. LEO9-025, 2009) (positing that "big law" is in permanent decline because of a host
of factors that have heretofore been "masked by a strong economy ... which maintained
strong demand for high-priced legal services").
218 Schlunk, supra note 5, at 14 (suggesting that if the current changes in the market
become permanent, future lawyers will need to "ratchet down their expectations not only with
respect to first-year compensation, but also with respect to job security and chances for part-
nership"). Additional taxes and fees that seem to be in the offing, at least in the near future,
will also likely take a toll on earnings available to law graduates. See, e.g., Lori Montgomery,
Once Considered Unthinkable, U.S. Sales Tax Gets Fresh Look, WASH. PosT, May 27, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/26/AR20 0 905260 2909.html
(describing a "surge of interest" among policymakers in the idea of a VAT).
219 See Morrissey, supra note 7, at 275.
220 Schlunk, supra note 5, at 14.
221 For a general introduction to the economic theory regarding asymmetric information,
see generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488 (1970).
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tion.222 On the other side, the sellers (law schools and lenders) are more
sophisticated entities with in-depth knowledge of their business, their in-
dustry, and the range of career and salary outcomes of alumni. The
schools and lenders are repeat players in this market. Students are one-
time participants, purchasing a legal education a single time. The uneven
nature of the negotiation is exacerbated when one considers the abundant
anecdotal evidence that law schools often entice prospective students
with lofty employment and salary expectations by pushing misleading
statistics and figures in marketing materials. 2 2 3 One particularly glaring
example of law school puffery highlights the broad-based problem:
Tulane University, for example, reports to U.S. News &
World Report magazine . . . that its law-school graduates
entering the job market in 2005 had a median salary of
$135,000. But that is based on a survey that only 24%
of that year's graduates completed, and those who did so
likely represent the cream of the class, a Tulane official
concedes .... 224
Aside from outright manipulation of the few transparent measures
of value available to the prospective law student, as this Article has al-
ready explored, the U.S. News ranking relied on by so many is deeply
flawed.2 2 5 Adding to the brew is the lack of sophistication or outright
ineptitude of the average starry-eyed prospective law student and an in-
flated sense of her own abilities.2 2 6 A recent survey by the test prepara-
222 See Matasar, Academic Fiduciary, supra note 90, at 88 ("[M]embers of the public,
including applicants to the school and its own graduates do not often have an accurate picture
of the school as it actually functions.").
223 See, e.g., Efrati, supra note 11 (observing that "[s]tudents entering law school have
little way of knowing how tight a job market they might face. The only employment data that
many prospective students see comes from school-promoted surveys that provide a far-from-
complete portrait of graduate experiences."); see also Morrissey, supra note 7, at 277 (sug-
gesting that the employment statistics routinely published by law schools "fail to state exactly
what those jobs are and what their graduates receive in compensation").
224 Efrati, supra note I1 (italics added). Lest one think the problem is unique to Tulane,
the author describes another episode:
A glossy admissions brochure for Brooklyn Law School ... reports a median salary
for recent graduates at law firms of well above $100,000. But that figure doesn't
reflect all incomes of graduates at firms; fewer than half of graduates at firms re-
sponded to the survey, the school reported to U.S. News. On its Web site, the school
reports that 41% of last year's graduates work for firms of more than 100 lawyers,
but it fails to mention that that percentage includes temporary attorneys, often work-
ing for hourly wages without benefits, Joan King, director of the school's career
center, concedes.
Id.
225 See supra Part I.B.2.
226 For a discussion of the phenomenon that persuades individuals to have an extremely
high opinion of their own abilities notwithstanding objective analysis to the contrary, see
THOMAs GR.oviCH, How WE KNow WHAT ISN'T So 77 (1991). Subjective expectations cer-
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tion company Kaplan highlights the lofty expectations or "statistical
ignorance" 227 of the latest batch of prospective law students:
A down economy hasn't dampened aspiring lawyers'
confidence in their ability to get a job in the legal field-
just their confidence in their peers' ability to do so. Ac-
cording to a recent Kaplan Test Prep and Admissions
survey of 330 pre-law students, 52% report that they are
"very confident" that they will find a job in the legal
field after graduating law school and passing the bar, but
only 16% say they are "very confident" that the majority
of their fellow aspiring lawyers will do the same. In
fact, only seven percent of respondents indicated a lack
of confidence in their own ability to secure employment
upon graduation. Pre-law students' attitudes are in keep-
ing with research showing that students aged 18-29 are
more optimistic about their economic future-despite a
sluggish job market-than past generations. 228
Furthermore, the many reasons individuals have for attending law
school in general (and a specific school in particular) are often not well
developed. 229 In fact, the majority of law students fall into two specific
categories: those employing law school matriculation as a "delaying tac-
tic," and those seeking a "means to an end." 2 30 The first group might be
described as follows:
They do not know what they want to do. They have
graduated from undergraduate school with a major that
has not led to employment. They have loans that are
coming due (or parents that are ready to toss them out of
tainly play a role in a student believing that he can overcome increasingly difficult odds to
enjoy a satisfactory outcome following graduation.
227 See Elie Mystal, The Hubris of Would-be Lawyers, ABovE L. (Apr. 13, 2010, 10:16
AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/04/the-hubris-of-would-be-lawyers/.
228 See Kaplan Survey: Despite Challenging Job Market, Tomorrow's Lawyers Appear to
Have a Healthy Outlook on Their Own Job Prospects, but not Their Classmates, Bus. WIRE,
(Apr. 12, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/home/permalink/
?ndmViewld=newsview&newsId=20100412006603&newsLang=en.
229 See Matasar, Rise and Fall, supra note 17, at 469-70 (noting that law students "come
to achieve wildly different goals" and summarizing several different reasons students cite for
their decision to attend); cf Richard A. Posner, The Next Generation of Law School Rankings:
Framing the Rankings Debate: Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 13 (2006) (offering that
"one would expect a rational student to invest a significant amount of time in learning about
the relevant characteristics of different law schools").
230 Matasar, Rise and Fall, supra note 17, at 469-70.
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their homes) and they find law school a relatively pain-
less extension of their student days.231
These delaying tactic students have been encouraged by a law
school system that requires no prescribed undergraduate curriculum, pro-
vides generous financial aid for students with high LSAT scores, and
allows students to "defer making a final decision about what they want to
do" 2 3 2 when they grow up.
The law students who see law school as a means to an end view
their three years as little more than a "hazing ritual" or a "painful step on
the way to making a living." 233 In fact, this group proves quite prag-
matic-in search of the "easiest course load that leads to the highest
grades and the quickest exit from school to the working world."234 Any
remaining students might be sorted as those hoping to go into business,
seeking a law school credential to advance in their current job or wanting
to become a law school professor.235
Regardless of the label used to characterize the typical law student,
there remains little doubt that her reasons for attending law school are
not as well developed as they might be. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect
that she will prove able to accurately forecast the expected value of a
legal education over the remainder of her lifetime. And, therefore, she
will not represent an adequate restraint on the pricing power of a more
seasoned lender and law school.
B. Applying Lessons from Enterprise Liability Theory
Burdening law schools with the risk of unsatisfactory outcomes re-
sulting from a system crafted by their design and under their control is
not without precedent. In fact, some of the basic lessons of enterprise
liability theory, a doctrine of modem tort law, are highly relevant in this
context and can offer a great deal of guidance. 236 Two tenets lie at the
heart of enterprise liability theory:
231 Id.; see also David Brooks, Life Lessons From Watergate, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/05/opinion/05brooks.html ("Fear of the unknown sends
thousands back to law school."); Schlunk, supra note 5, at n.4 (observing that law school is "a
favorite destination for undergraduates who are very bright but who do not have terribly mar-
ketable degrees").
232 Matasar, Rise and Fall, supra note 17, at 470.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 See id. Very humorously, the Dean also describes one student who told him that he
enrolled in law school at the University of Florida "in order to maintain his football ticket
priority." Id.
236 See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) [hereinafter Calabresi, Risk Distribution] (describing enterprise
liability theory and its underpinnings and analyzing related case law through the lens of enter-
prise liability theory); Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault
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First, activities should bear their characteristic accident
costs. Fault liability pins the costs of the nonnegligent
accidents that are the long-run price of an activity's pres-
ence in the world on the random victims of the activity.
Enterprise liability pins those accident costs on the activ-
ity-the enterprise-which imposed the nonnegligent
risks responsible for the injuries at issue. Second, enter-
prise liability holds that an enterprise's accident costs
should be distributed among the members of the enter-
prise. The costs of an injury should be shared by those
who profit from the activity responsible for the injury;
they should not be concentrated on the injured party, or
be dispersed across unrelated activities.237
Frequently, enterprise liability theory is associated with the twin ec-
onomic goals of "allocative efficiency and loss-spreading." 238 More
simply, enterprise liability aims to reduce an accident's costs and com-
pensate its victims by allocating each accident's cost to the enterprise
whose activities gave rise to the accident. 239 This reallocation compels
the enterprise enjoying the benefits of an activity to internalize the re-
lated accident costs, and thus prods the enterprise to make an economic
decision about whether to participate in an activity. Specifically, the the-
ory encourages a firm to determine whether a proposed activity is eco-
nomically viable in light of its likely future accident costs and other
concomitant expenses. By reducing the externalities of activities that im-
pose accident costs on society, enterprise liability compels "the mar-
ket . . to tell us whether we want an activity despite its accident
costs." 2 4 0 At the very least, it encourages the market to shape the activity
into a more macro-efficient version.
The tenets and principles of enterprise liability form the basis of
modem, abnormally dangerous activity law. 2 4 1 In essence, enterprise lia-
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1965) (discussing "a theoretical framework for
nonfault liability in which risky activities reflect in their market prices the cost of their acci-
dents") [hereinafter Calabresi, Nonfault Allocation]; Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enter-
prise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1285 (2001) (discussing
the history enterprise liability theory). Another prominent doctrine of modern tort law is fault-
based negligence. See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1225 (2001).
237 Keating, supra note 236, at 1286 (footnotes omitted).
238 Id. at 1287 (footnotes omitted).
239 See Calabresi, Nonfault Allocation, supra note 236, at 719.
240 Id. at 720.
241 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20 (2004);
Calabresi, Risk Distribution, supra note 236, at 541; Keating, supra note 236, at 1318-23; cf.
Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. Amer. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177-78 (7th Cir. 1990)
(not applying strict liability to the transportation of acrylonitrile, a flammabale and highly
toxic chemical).
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bility dictates that when an abnormally dangerous activity, such as the
transportation of gasoline via tractor-trailer, 242 results in accidental phys-
ical harm to an individual, then the enterprise engaged in (and benefiting
from) the abnormally dangerous activity should bear the costs of the ac-
cident instead of the individual who was accidentally harmed. 24 3 Thus,
by reallocating the costs of the tractor-trailer explosion from the innocent
motorist to the transport company, the company is compelled to reevalu-
ate its transport methods and activities in light of now-internalized acci-
dent costs. The alternative would be for the victim to bear the costs of an
accident. In such a regime, a non-participant in the dangerous enterprise,
powerless to alter or improve operating policies, would bear the acci-
dent's burden. Such a system would lack economic efficiency, and in-
stead impose unnecessary and inefficient accident costs on society. As
the theory goes, allowing a portion of the enterprise's accident costs to
be externalized would skew the enterprise's cost-benefit calculus, mak-
ing it macro-inefficient. 2M
By most accounts, higher education does not qualify as an abnor-
mally dangerous activity. And physical harm generally does not flow
from disappointing post-law school student outcomes. The general prin-
ciples of enterprise liability theory should not be dismissed, however,
because they do provide the foundation for a just, fair and economically
efficient method of allocating the risks and costs of higher education fail-
ures and shortcomings. Just as businesses can reap profits from useful
yet abnormally dangerous activities, the legal higher education enterprise
of law schools and student loan lenders invariably profit from successive
batches of virgin law students. Law schools and lenders are the sophisti-
cated, well-informed, repeat players in this market. By contrast, the less
informed, one-time participants, legal education consumers are often left
to handle unmanageable debt loads when the high-paying law firm jobs
touted by school marketing materials fail to materialize. 2 4 5
Applying enterprise liability theory to "accidents" in which student
borrowers fail to realize the anticipated benefits of a legal education dic-
tates that the law schools and lenders should bear the costs of acci-
dents-not the student-turned-accident-victim. Relative to law schools
and lenders, the student is less able to recognize the risk of failure a
priori and has less ability to either bear or spread its cost. Furthermore,
242 See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Wash. 1972); cf Indiana Harbor, 916
F.2d at 1178 (holding that the transportation of acrylonitrile through the Chicago metropolitan
area is not an abnormally dangerous activity).
243 See Calabresi, Risk Distribution, supra note 236, at 1320-22.
244 See Keating, supra note 236, at 1287.
245 See ABA, VALUE PROPOSITION, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that "[t]he combination of
the rising cost of a legal education and the realities of the legal job market mean that going to
law school may not pay off for a large number of law students").
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because the student is a non-repeat participant in the law school market,
allocating the cost to the student would do little to encourage the preven-
tion of future noneconomic law student outcomes. The schools and the
lenders, on the other hand, have greater resources, are in a superior posi-
tion to assess the risks of noneconomic outcomes from the outset, and are
repeat players in the law school market. In other words, they have the
ability to take significant actions to prevent future student "accidents"
and are better suited to bear the costs of sub-par student outcomes.
While certainly not controlling, an analogy to a prominent strict lia-
bility torts case is appropriate. Lubin v. Iowa City2 4 6 applied enterprise
liability to homeowner losses arising from bursting water pipes main-
tained by a municipal waterworks company. 247 In that case, the Iowa
City waterworks had adopted a cost-saving policy of foregoing regular
inspections and repairs of its water pipes in favor of simply waiting for
the pipes to burst before replacing them.2 4 8 Under the prevalent tort doc-
trine of negligence, 249 this cost-motivated practice "concentrate[d] the
costs of inevitable pipe ruptures on those unlucky enough to suffer
them."250 Such a strategy bears a remarkable resemblance to the current
model of education embraced by our nation's law schools. Today, the
higher education complex reaps its reward from the debt-financed tuition
dollars of its students. Its policies foster average tuitions and fees well
beyond the ability of most students to repay without significant diffi-
culty. After pocketing the proceeds, 251 a system controlled by the
schools and the ABA externalizes and concentrates the bulk of the risks
and costs of unfavorable, post-law school outcomes on the majority of
students "unlucky" enough to not realize the six-figure salaries touted in
law school marketing brochures. 252 The Lubin court might have charac-
terized such a "distribution of burdens and benefits" 253 as "neither just
nor reasonable." 2 5 4
246 Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1964).
247 See Keating, supra note 236, at 1321-23. For an interesting article about a different
kind of pipe, see Michael C. Macchiarola, Get Shorty: Toward Resurrecting the SEC's Ill-
Fated Pursuit of PIPE Arbitrageurs, 4 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 1 (2009).
248 Id.
249 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 18 (2004).
250 Keating, supra note 236, at 1321 (discussing Lubin, 131 N.W.2d at 770-71).
251 Actually, proceeds are either "paid out" in the form of higher salaries or perquisites for
faculty, staff and administration, or "plowed back" into the school in the form of various
improvements to facilities or endowments.
252 An alternative, but unlikely, policy could be for law schools to charge tuitions com-
mensurate with the expected post-graduation salaries of its indebted students. This policy
would decrease the risk of "accidents" in student outcomes but would also likely lead to signif-
icantly lower revenues and profits for law schools.
253 Keating, supra note 236, at 1321.
254 Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Iowa 1964).
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As a result of a similar fundamental unfairness, the Lubin court ap-
plied strict liability to compensate the victim "whose property is dam-
aged without fault of his own" pursuant to enterprise liability theory:
If the City accepts the advantages of lower maintenance
costs and other benefits which result from the practice of
burying long lasting cast iron pipe six feet underground
beyond any reasonable opportunity to inspect . . . it
should also expect to pay for the damages resulting from
such practice as a cost of its doing business in this
manner.255
Today, the Lubin decision points the way for higher education re-
form. As in Lubin, if law schools accept the benefits of their policy of
inflating tuitions beyond the affordability thresholds of the bulk of their
students, they should expect to internalize the costs of accidents caused
by such practices. This Article's proposal asks nothing more than the
court did in Lubin. Substantial costs are borne in the post-graduation
lives of numerous law graduates who fail, despite good faith efforts, to
realize income levels sufficient to justify the high tuitions typical among
American law schools. These costs should not be borne by the graduates
alone-especially when the students interested in eventually practicing
law have little choice but to take part in a system the design, control, and
cost of which they cannot affect.
IV. THE PROPOSAL: OPTIONS FOR STUDENTS
Five years ago, with the United States economy benefiting from the
Great Moderation 256 and the corresponding rising tide that seemed to lift
all boats, Richard Matasar, the Dean of New York Law School, penned a
sobering and prescient assessment of the future of America's law
schools:
The great success of American legal education has been
buoyed by cheap money, a perception that there are not
many viable alternatives, a sense that a legal education is
an excellent long-term investment, students' belief that
255 Keating, supra note 236, at 1321 (quoting Lubin at 770-71) (footnote omitted).
256 According to the New York Times, James Stock, a Harvard economist, coined the
phrase "Great Moderation" to describe the decline in the variability of both output and infla-
tion during the period from the mid-1980s through the first half-decade of the twenty-first
century. See Origins of 'The Great Moderation,' N.Y. TU Es, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/01/23/business/23leonside.html?_r-landref=business. The phrase gained a
wider acceptance after Ben Bernanke (then a governor of the Federal Reserve) introduced it in
a speech in 2004. See Ben S. Bernanke, Remarks at the Meetings of the Eastern Economic
Association: The Great Moderation (Feb. 20, 2004), available at http://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/boarddoes/speeches/2004/20040220/default.htm (espousing the numerous bene-
fits of a decline in macroeconomic volatility).
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they are the exception to any negative trends, and the
historically accurate belief that the legal profession is so
robust that it will always outrun the debt that students
take to become lawyers. In the years to come, each of
these trends will change substantially and jeopardize the
legal academy. 257
Against his assertion that "high-priced schools, with moderate pres-
tige, will not survive, unless they change," 258 Dean Matasar called for
schools like his to take the difficult steps necessary to create real value
for students or face extinction.259 In recent years, a slew of commenta-
tors have picked up the trumpet to sound the alarm for the law
schools. 260 To date, however, meaningful progress has largely eluded
schools and policymakers alike. The problem is a rather simple one to
diagnose: it is the classic sources-and-uses riddle. With sources of funds
slowing, in many cases rapidly, and uses (many of which are fixed)
showing no sign of retreat, the life of a law school dean ain't what it used
to be.26 1 Not surprisingly, many schools have gone on a diet; responding
to the problem with internal efforts at budget restraint and self-improve-
ment. Noble as this work may be, in the long run, many schools will
learn that the finance gods do not smile kindly on noneconomic models.
All the good intentions in the world will not overcome an inflexible sys-
tem deeply flawed in its design and incentives. And, thus far, any solu-
tion to the external forces supporting the current state of affairs has
proven too costly for one entrenched interest group or another.262 It
seems that "[a]cademicians are like everybody else-in favor of progress
257 Matasar, Rise and Fall, supra note 17, at 494.
258 Id. at 496; see also Schwarzschild, supra note 11, at 9 (considering whether the "old
school tie" that exists between many lawmakers and the law schools they attended would be
enough to generally insulate law schools from legislative change).
259 His prescription is a menu of options by which law schools could choose a viable path,
including (i) allowance for accelerated coursework to lower costs, (ii) law schools as "mini-
universities" with multiple entry and exit points for students, (iii) membership in international
and domestic consortia, partnerships and joint ventures to broaden the legal education, and (iv)
mergers, acquisitions and going out of business sales. Matasar, Rise and Fall, supra note 17,
at 498-503; see also Garvey, supra note 78, at 39 (listing a "dozen strategies for coping" with
rising law school costs while remaining faithful to the mission of educating great lawyers).
260 See, e.g., Alex Williams, No Longer Their Golden Ticket, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan 17, 2010, at
ST20; Nando, Overpriced Legal Education, THIRD TIER REALITY BLOG (Aug. 29, 2009, 7:40
AM), http://thirdtierreality.blogspot.com/2009/08/overpriced-legal-education.html.
261 See generally Julie Kay, Wanted: Law School Deans. Lots of Them, LAW.COM (Feb.
2, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202427889176&slretum=l&hb-
xlogin=l (observing that a great number of law school deanships remain unfilled and com-
menting that "law school deanships, once highly sought after, are now high-stress jobs, thanks
in part to the economy").
262 See Cohen, supra note 1, at 27 ("[Ilt serves the interest of those in the legal profession
that passage through law school is an expensive, time-consuming proposition.").
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but opposed to change." 263 In short, whether willing to admit it or not,
the enterprise is invested in the status quo. 2 64
Instead of cosmetic fixes, a radical change is needed to redirect the
academy toward producing value for its students. In the spirit of enter-
prise liability theory and its underlying societal welfare maximizing prin-
ciples, a superior model of higher education financing can be designed to
replace our current system and reshape the entire American legal educa-
tion model for the benefit of students. Such a redesign could protect the
interests of both the borrowers and lenders. At the same time, such a
system could measure the individual law schools' effectiveness in train-
ing lawyers economically. Overall, the current system is more historical
accident than anything else. It represents an unintelligible creature:
loaded with perverse incentives, inflexible in its application, and immune
to any rational measure of performance or value. The improved system
this Article offers could both succeed as a credible loss-spreading mecha-
nism and efficiently minimize future "accidents" via reduction of
externalities.
Before presenting the proposal, a word of caution is warranted.
This work represents the original version of an idea that can, no doubt,
be improved by the further attention, analysis, and thoughts of the Arti-
cle's authors and others in the academic, legal, and business communi-
ties. This Article's value will, therefore, be in its ability to introduce an
alternative framework through which the academy might move toward a
more rational and sustainable model. In that regard, this Article might be
more a guide to thought than a "do-list item for the next Congressional
session." 2 6 5 With that said, on to the model.
At the outset, a few financial terms must be introduced. A "put
option," for example, is a financial contract between two parties whereby
a put buyer purchases from a put seller the right, but not the obligation,
to sell (to the put seller) an underlying security or other item of value at
an agreed-upon price.266 This agreed-upon price is typically referred to
263 Stephen Joel Trachtenberg, Degrees and the Marketplace, N.Y. TIMEs ROOM FOR DE-
BATE BLOG (Jan. 3, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/are-
they-students-or-customers/.
264 See WILLIAM M. SuLLIvAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PRO-
FESSION OF LAW 33 (2007) (observing that "[e]fforts for change, reform and innovation" be-
come struggles against existing constraints, thereby draining "energy and attention from the
imaginative work of considering, creating, trying, and evaluating alternative possibilities")
[hereinafter Carnegie Report]; see also Cohen, supra note 1, at 29 ("[T]hose who have the
power to decide how a law school operates will act purposefully and often in their own narrow
self-interest.").
265 McCusker, supra note 5.
266 See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 697 (9th ed. 2008).
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as the "strike price" or "exercise price." 267 In exchange for this right, the
put buyer pays a fee to the put seller. This fee is referred to as the "pre-
mium" and is typically paid at the time the parties enter into the option
contract. 268 A slight twist on the traditional put option is the "cash-set-
tled put option." Upon a put buyer's exercise of a cash-settled put op-
tion, the put seller pays to the put buyer the cash difference between the
value of the relevant underlier at exercise and the strike price, instead of
selling the underlier.
Having established the nomenclatu.e and basic operation of a typi-
cal put option, the put principles can next be applied to the area of law
school financing. In the baseline case, a prospective student, looking to
borrow money from a lender, might be offered a put option along with
her loan. Specifically, this put option would only be exercisable on an
"exercise date" ten years after the borrower's graduation from law school
and then only in the event (and to the extent) that the actual earnings of
the borrower fail to exceed some expected earnings amount established
concurrent with the borrower's graduation. A predetermined "Minimum
Expected Earnings Amount" would constitute the strike price of the put.
The Minimum Expected Earnings Amount would be based upon both
(i) the size of the student's expected debt burden resulting from the fi-
nancing of her education and (ii) a percentage of a student's gross profes-
sional income that can reasonably be expected to be available for student
loan payments. If, for example, a determination is made that fifteen per-
cent of a student's earnings should be available for debt repayment, the
Minimum Expected Earnings Amount will be the quotient resulting from
dividing (1) the student's Expected Burden (discussed below) by (2) fif-
teen percent. In effect, this mechanism would set a floor for the gross
income required during a "measurement period" for a student to comfort-
ably repay the total amount of her law school loans by the measurement
period's conclusion.269 The measurement period would typically extend
from the student's graduation date through the exercise date of the put.
267 See id. at 565-69.
268 In the typical case, a put option on a share of stock gives the put buyer the right to sell
the stock for the exercise price. In the event that the stock is selling at a price greater than the
exercise price, the put will be left unexercised and will expire worthless. If, however, the
stock price turns out to be less than the exercise price on the exercise date, the put owner will
take advantage of her option and exercise the put, realizing, as profit, the difference between
the exercise price and the stock's lower market price. It should also be noted that some more
exotic options can arrange for the premium to be paid in a different manner or at a different
time. Accreting strike options, for example, imbed the premium in a strike price that changes
over time.
269 When potential mismatches between the timing of actual income flows and the pro-
jected timing of loan payments are fully considered, the model requires adjustments for the
time value of money that are beyond the scope of this Article's consideration.
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By design, the amount of income earned during this measurement
period serves as the chief risk-shifting mechanism in the proposed struc-
ture. In the event that a graduate's earnings from employment during the
decade following graduation fail to meet the Minimum Expected Earn-
ings Amount threshold, the put will be "in-the-money." That is, the put
buyer will be able to exercise her put option. In this case, upon a valid
exercise of her option, the put buyer (i.e., the student-turned-lawyer)
would be forgiven a portion of her remaining loan obligation. 2 7 0 Also
upon a valid exercise, the law school would be required to publicly dis-
close the fact that the degree has been "put."2 7 1
The formula to determine the amount of loan forgiveness (the "For-
giveness Amount") that a borrower would receive upon the valid exer-
cise of a put right is described by the following equation:
Forgiveness Amount = (1 - [Actual Earnings / Minimum Expected
Earnings Amount]) * Expected Burden
The inputs to the formula are explained below. "Actual Earnings"
would be determined from the relevant IRS filings of the borrower dur-
ing the measurement period and would simply reflect the borrower's em-
ployment income during the period. 272 The "Expected Burden" would
equal the total amount of all loan payments expected by the exercise date
and would be determined according to (1) the student's original loan bal-
ance at graduation, (2) the projected interest rate(s) on the loan(s), and
(3) certain assumptions as to the frequency, size, and timing of loan pay-
ments by the borrower.
An example illustrates the new financing structure as it might de-
velop. Assume Ms. Average, representing the average private law
school graduate, borrowed $92,000 to fund her law school education
with a direct loan carrying a 6% interest rate.2 7 3 At graduation, assuming
270 The "forgiveness" should come in the form of a reimbursement from the law school.
The details of the forgiveness will vary based on the type(s) of financing involved.
271 This Article assumes that certain information would be collected and incorporated into
the various law school rankings. Such data should include the number and frequency of exer-
cisable puts and the mean and variance of those puts at each school. This information would
represent a meaningful measure of 'output' that so many have found missing from the various
rankings methodologies that currently exist. In addition, such data should answer many of the
concerns surrounding the subjectivity of output measures and could substantially shorten the
"time-lag" problem raised by some output naysayers. See infra Part V.E.
272 Some additional thought must be given to exactly how this number will be measured
and verified.
273 The $92,000 amount is derived from the approximate average debt burden of a private
law school student as reported by the ABA. See ABA, Average Amount Borrowed, supra note
34. This example simplifies the standard mechanics of law school student loan disbursement
for the sake of readability. Normally, such loan proceeds are spread out over each of the three
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her interest was subsidized during her time in law school, 274 she would
owe $92,000 at graduation. Around the time of her graduation, the
$92,000 amount and the 6% interest rate would be used to calculate the
Expected Burden and, in turn, establish the Minimum Expected Earnings
Amount. In this example, the total amount Ms. Average would be ex-
pected to pay in principal and interest over the decade following her
graduation, the Expected Burden, would be $122,566.63, assuming 120
equal monthly payments over those ten years. 275 Furthermore, one
would expect Ms. Average to earn at least $817,110.87 in the decade
following her graduation in order to comfortably repay the original
$92,000 loan amount with interest during the measurement period.276
When the exercise date arrives in the tenth year following gradua-
tion, Ms. Average will determine whether the put is exercisable. In the
event that her professional pre-tax earnings during the measurement fall
short of the $817,110.87 Minimum Expected Earnings Amount, she will
be able to take advantage of her put right. For the sake of the example,
assume that Ms. Average was able to earn only $717,110.87 profession-
ally during the measurement period. In that case, she will have a
$100,000 disappointment compared to the agreed upon Minimum Ex-
pected Earnings Amount and will, therefore, have the right to exercise a
put that will net a $15,000.00 Forgiveness Amount.277 A few observa-
tions can be made about our example. First, as the magnitude of Ms.
Average's professional earnings disappointment grows, the amount of
available loan forgiveness also grows. If, for example, her earnings dur-
ing the measurement period were only $617,110.87, the Forgiveness
Amount available from the put's exercise would be equal to $30,000.278
Second, the amount of loan forgiveness determined by the formula will
not necessarily be sufficient to entirely extinguish the remaining student
loan balance of a particular student, because actual payment schedules
may differ from the expected payments due to such things as loan defer-
rals, delinquent payments and penalties, prepayments, and alternative re-
payment schedules. Finally, in the event that the Forgiveness Amount is
greater than the remaining loan balance at the time of the put's exercise,
years of law school with the possibility of different interest rates and other terms applying to
the different loans, and disbursed semi-annually to the law school.
274 This is an assumption made for ease of explanation.
275 A simple amortization schedule reveals 120 equal monthly payments of $1,021.39
representing total payments of $122,566.63 (of which $30,566.63 represents interest).
276 For ease of demonstration, this number is simply the quotient of the Expected Burden
divided by fifteen percent. The amount is meant to represent earnings that will ensure that the
borrower can comfortably repay her loan, using, for the sake of example, fifteen percent of her
gross professional income. In reality, the calculation, as well as the determination of Actual
Earnings, should include adjustments in respect of the time value of money.
277 Forgiveness Amount = (1 - [717,110.87 / 817,110.87]) * 122,566.63 = 15,000.
278 Forgiveness Amount = (I - [617,110.87 / 817,110.87]) * 122,566.63 = 30,000.
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the entire remaining loan balance will be extinguished, with the applica-
ble law school (or its insurance provider) paying the borrower any sur-
plus in cash.
Preconditions could be added to the put exercise right, such as a
minimum threshold for Forgiveness Amounts that enable exercise of the
put in order to reduce administrative costs. A more controversial struc-
ture might require, as a condition precedent to the exercise of the put
right, that the lawyer borrower be required to renounce her law school
degree (and forebear from using any law school credits earned), inform-
ing both the law school and the state bar associations of any jurisdictions
in which she was licensed to practice law. This condition could prove
particularly daunting for borrowers in the legal profession because of the
professional licensing requirements unique to the practice of law. Be-
cause most jurisdictions require a degree from an accredited law school
for bar admission,279 a lawyer deciding to exercise her option in such a
regime would ease her debt burden only at the cost of her legal career!280
There seems little room for abuse by the students if this condition is
added, as it would take a particularly patient arbitrageur to embark on a
three-year course of legal education with the intention of putting back the
degree some time following graduation. On the other hand, this law
school degree renunciation could frustrate the goals of the proposed
structure. Renunciation would undoubtedly have the effect of limiting
the number of borrowers with positive (perhaps significantly positive)
Forgiveness Amounts who would choose to exercise their put rights. To
choose to exercise in such an environment, the borrower would have to
subjectively value her law degree less than the available Forgiveness
Amount. Therefore, the insistence of this condition could lead to the
proposed structure having a minimal or insufficient effect on law school
bottom lines, and the condition could thus fail to sufficiently reduce the
externalities in the legal higher education market. The authors of this
Article acknowledge and appreciate the persuasive arguments on both
sides of the issue of whether to require renunciation for the put's exercise
279 See Donna Fossum, Law School Accreditation Standards and the Structure of Ameri-
can Legal Education, 3 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 515, 517-22 (1978) (tracing the history of law
school accreditation and how accredited law school graduation became an eligibility require-
ment for admission to the bar); see also Cohen, supra note 1, at 25, 27 (observing that "[tihe
ABA has successfully lobbied legislatures in all but [three] states to prohibit anyone who has
not attended an ABA accredited law school from taking the state bar exam"). For an attack on
this monopoly restriction on bar admission, see John S. Elson, The Governmental Maintenance
of the Privileges of Legal Academia: A Case Study in Classic Rent-Seeking and a Challenge to
Our Democratic Values, 15 Sr. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 269 (2001) [hereinafter Elson,
Classic Rent-Seeking].
280 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1, at 27-28. A technical change might need to be ex-
plored because most states require graduation from an ABA-accredited school to sit for the bar
exam. Here, an on-going requirement might be warranted.
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and continue to explore the issue. We most welcome further discussion
of this feature within the academy.
The structure proposed by this Article aims to be flexible enough to
allow for the posting of collateral during the term of the measurement
period. For example, the federal government could require the borrower
to "check-in" at annual or biannual intervals, requiring collateral to be
posted by the law school or its insurer in the event that the borrower's
earnings are failing to keep pace with those suggested by the original
model. Such a collateral posting mechanism might aid in price discovery
if and when the law school looks to purchase ongoing hedges or insur-
ance for succeeding classes of students. 28 1 In addition, the collateral
posting mechanism should have the effect of protecting the federal gov-
ernment (assuming some form of guarantee survives in this market) in
the event that a law school ultimately defaults on a put payment and the
affected student compels the government to make the affected student
whole.
Although raising issues beyond the scope of this Article, this struc-
ture should also prove flexible enough to work seamlessly with public
service loan forgiveness programs in the event that a lawyer decides to
go into public service and qualifies for forgiveness under such a public
service program. In effect, a year of qualified public service employ-
ment for which the government provides the student with loan forgive-
ness could reduce the Forgiveness Amount under this model by the
amount forgiven under the public service program. 282
The results of a system that allows borrowers to ease their debt bur-
den by exercising put rights against their law school will be quite inter-
esting to observe. Of course, the eventual outcomes cannot be known.
Yet, this Article takes comfort in the corollary to that old adage, "if it
ain't broke, don't fix it." If it is broke, it must be fixed! Ivory Tower,
Inc. continues to show the classic signs of an overbought offering, and its
fundamentals might not justify a price that has been driven, in large
part, by unsophisticated and leveraged speculators. This proposal aims
to protect schools and students alike by offering measures to ensure that
price can be supported by fundamental value.
While certainty of outcomes cannot be assured, we can anticipate a
few likely outcomes should the government ever adopt the proposal.
First, a system similar to the one outlined above would mean that law
schools would face an additional, real risk that a portion of the originated
281 For a discussion of the potential development of a secondary market through which
law schools may decide to hedge or insure their "put exercise risk," see infra Part V.B.
282 Under such a model, obtaining forgiveness under a public service style program prior
to the exercise date of the put should result in additional adjustments to the Forgiveness
Amount to account for the time value of money.
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loan might be forgiven and, therefore, not paid in full. In response, the
due diligence performed on prospective students and expenditures should
improve to account for the increased risk. This is a very desirable result
for all involved in the process, as improved diligence is likely to result in
the divergence and customization of law schools to match the educa-
tional needs and expected salaries of their students. A one-size-fits-all
culture that perpetuates poor value propositions at most law schools
might give way to a more nuanced approach that balances costs to the
actual expected outcomes of each institution's unique student base. Just
as such a system is likely to save some students from the consequences
of noneconomic decisions, schools with a conscience should also wel-
come a system that both compels schools to more critically evaluate the
value of expenditures and discourages students for whom the value pro-
position does not work before they become encumbered with an enor-
mous debt load.2 8 3 Ultimately, such a system should portend a more
efficient higher education market-with overly optimistic student expec-
tations tempered by market forces. 2 84
An added benefit of this system should develop over time. With
data becoming available as to the frequency of put exercises by the grad-
uates of each of the nation's law schools and the average Forgiveness
Amounts granted at each institution (along with distribution data), pro-
spective law students will finally have their long-sought, transparent,
non-manipulated measure of value. 2 8 5 Armed with this information, stu-
dents should be able to make better matriculation decisions-again, of-
fering a certain self-correction to the distorted higher education market.
V. RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSAL
Those with a stake in the current system of law school financing are
likely to express concern with this Article's proposal. Insiders do not
easily examine the limits of the system within which they work. In fact,
in the law school context, they have proven remarkably reluctant to scru-
283 See Bennett, supra note 14 ("Our colleges and universities should be more willing to
shoulder their responsibilities to students, their families and taxpayers. Too often, these re-
sponsibilities have been evaded. This we can no longer afford.").
284 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test, 81 IND. L. 25, 27
(2006) ("Perhaps law schools should be ranked through a market test, one that relies on the
choices of the people directly involved: students who apply to law schools.").
285 See, e.g., RYAN C. AMACHER & ROGER E. MEINERS, FAULTY TOWERS: TENURE AND
THE STRucruRE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 29 (2004) ("For colleges, the mission is not to maxi-
mize profit, but rather, perhaps, to maximize the quality of their educational output over
time."); Cohen, supra note 1, at 26 (offering that "there is an inverse relationship between law
school rank and the quality of the legal education offered"); Matasar, Rise and Fall, supra note
17, at 476 (lamenting that "the best metric for assessing the quality of a school would still
seem to be 'outputs"'); Pollak, supra note 92, at 54 (referring to current rankings as "a prize
that may beguile, but not intelligently inform, those who are planning to study law").
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tinize the productivity of the school in terms of whether it is truly di-
rected to the needs of its paying customer (the student). Indeed, "[a]s
entities where self-governance reigns, self-service is rarely ques-
tioned." 286 Therefore, several critiques of the proposal can be
anticipated.
A. "Creaming" (Version 1)
The main criticism of the proposal is that requiring law schools to
bear the risk of their graduates exercising a put right will further drive up
costs, discourage law schools from offering admission (and lenders from
making loans) to well-qualified students from non-upper-class families
and defeat the original purpose of federal student loan programs. How-
ever, if the victims of exclusion avoid a clique comprised of law school
graduates who are struggling like the dickens to repay their stifling debt
levels, an argument rooted in "inclusion" seems rather curious. Moreo-
ver, such a "creaming" concern should be tempered by at least two
factors.
First, the fact that higher education, unlike most other goods and
services, is an "associative" good suggests that top-tier law schools will
continue to admit and compete for well-qualified students from lower
income brackets.287 In general, when selecting which producer of an as-
sociative good to patronize, consumer choice is dictated by "not just the
quality and price of the firm's products, but also ... the personal charac-
teristics of the firm's other customers." 288 With the potential student as
discerning customer, a law school's desirability is driven, in large part,
by the quality of its other students. 289 Professor Hansmann provides an
excellent example in the undergraduate context: "Harvard College would
be nowhere near so attractive to prospective applicants if Harvard's
faculty, curriculum, and facilities were to remain as they are, but its other
students-past, present, and future-were entirely mediocre." 290 Since a
school's desirability to all students (wealthy, poor, and those in between)
would be diminished by its exclusion of a qualified penurious applicant
286 Macchiarola & Macchiarola, supra note 44.
287 See Henry Hansmann, Higher Education as an Associative Good 12-13 (Yale Law,
Econ, & Pub. Policy No. 99-15, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=192576 [hereinafter Hansmann, Associative Good]. Notably, however, at the
lower tiers, higher education tends to shed its "associative" character. At these lower levels,
education is increasingly becoming a "commodity." Id. at 12.
288 Henry Hansmann, Proprieta' e Concorrenza nell'Istruzione Universitaria [Ownership
and Competition in Higher Education], 1 MERCATO CONCORRENZA REGOLE [MARKET COMPE-
TrnON REG.] 475, 487 (1999) (It.), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/
Faculty/HansmannTheStateandtheMarketinHigherEducation.pdf [hereinafter
Hansmann, Ownership and Competition].
289 See id.
290 Id. at 488.
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in favor of a less qualified prosperous one, there exists a natural check on
the possibility that law schools would react to this Article's proposal by
squeezing out lower income students. 291
Second, it is likely that a lower-tier of affordable "trade type"
schools will develop to fill the void for lower-tier, lower-income stu-
dents. In fact, it is hoped that this Article's proposal, if adopted, will arm
the significant, admirable, and vitally important lobby that argues for the
need for additional public service and legal aid lawyers 292 with addi-
tional ammunition in efforts to break the stranglehold of the ABA- and
U.S. News-encouraged one-size-fits-all model of legal education! 293 In
its current rigidity, the ABA lock on accreditation and bar admission has
outlived its useful life. 2 9 4 Again, "[i]f something cannot go on forever, it
will stop." 295
B. Law School Budget Forecasting Uncertainties
Another criticism of this Article's proposal will likely focus on the
uncertainty that student borrower put rights might bring to long-term law
school budgets. Under this line of reasoning, the inability of a school to
291 There is evidence that elite higher education institutions in the United States agree to
charge full price "to talented students who are prosperous, and [use] the proceeds to improve
their student bodies by attracting larger numbers of talented students who are impecunious.
Hansmann, Associative Good, supra note 287, at 12 (using the example of the Ivy League
colleges).
292 See, e.g., MELANCA CLARK & MAGGIE BARRON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, NEW
YORK UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, FORECLOSURES: A CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 2 (2009)
(arguing that too few people have access to qualified legal guidance and, as a result, many
homeowners are losing their homes "because they lack the ability to navigate the landscape of
our lending laws"); John T. Broderick Jr. & Ronald M. George, A Nation of Do-It-Yourself
Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 1, 2010, at A21 (interviewing the Chief Justices of New Hampshire
and California about the challenge of the recent increase in pro se appearances as a result of
the worsening economy); John Schwartz, Cash Squeeze Said to Deny Legal Aid to Poor, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 29, 2009, at A22 (observing that nearly a million people are being denied repre-
sentation in U.S. courts because legal aid clinics lack sufficient funding).
293 There are reams of very interesting scholarship offering alternative models. While
beyond the scope of this Article, exploration of these arguments and increased experimentation
is welcomed. See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, www.lawschool.edu: Legal Education in the
Digital Age, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 85; Marina Lao, Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust and
Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 1035 (2001) (describing a no-frills model that could be
offered in addition to today's exclusive "elite school" offering); Peter W. Martin, Employing
Technology to Erode Legal Education's Twin Barriers of Distance and Cost, 61 RUTG. L.
REV. 1115 (2009) (considering non-law school methods of professional education); Van Zandt,
supra note 199, at 1143-44; William K.S. Wang, The Restructuring of Legal Education Along
Functional Lines, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUEs 331 (2008) (describing an unbundling of the five
distinct education services provided by the law school).
294 See generally Elson, Classic Rent-Seeking, supra note 279 (arguing that ABA Section
of Legal Education might review its law school accreditation standards to allow for more cost-
efficient law school models).
295 Herb Stein's Unfamiliar Quotations: On Money, Madness and Making Mistakes,
SLATE (May 16, 1997, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2561.
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accurately anticipate the frequency and magnitude of future put exercises
by its alumni would hinder long-term budgeting capabilities, perhaps
even compelling schools to be overly conservative in anticipation of un-
known put exercise rates. As the argument goes, this uncertainty might
push schools to the point of compromising their educational missions by
promoting excessive cuts to essential programs.
Such an argument fails to appreciate the fact that the uncertainty of
put exercises can be effectively managed and controlled by law schools.
In fact, to hedge their exposure to student put rights that are only exercis-
able in the somewhat distant future, law schools could purchase insur-
ance or customized derivatives contracts in the over-the-counter market.
Through insurance or derivatives contracts with financial intermediaries,
law schools could, for an upfront price, hedge all of their exposure to
student put rights and thereby gain visibility for budget forecasting
purposes.
This secondary market for student put rights would come with an
added benefit: market information regarding the varying value proposi-
tions offered by different law schools. The upfront insurance or deriva-
tives premiums paid by law schools would vary depending on a
sophisticated, independent financial institutions' assessment of the likeli-
hood of put exercise by graduates from a particular school. This varia-
tion would provide a neutral appraisal of the differences in the value
propositions offered by law schools. Any secondary market resale prices
paid by financial institutions or other investors to purchase these hedging
contracts would similarly provide an indirect market signal regarding the
values offered by various J.D. programs. The potential usefulness of this
market data to law students and the publishers of various law school
rankings dictates that the pricing data in this secondary market should be
required to be transparent and publicly reported.
While the exact nature, permitted participants, regulatory frame-
work, and other details of a robust secondary market for student put right
hedging contracts is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted
that many of the shortcomings of over-the-counter derivatives markets
that were exposed by the recent financial crisis can be overcome.296 For
example, counterparty credit risk (the risk of default by the financial in-
stitution insuring a law school's put risk) can be reduced through the
296 See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFoRM-A NEw FOUNDA-
nON: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 2 (2009) available at http://
www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY
WHrrEPAPER]; DARRELL DUFFIE, ADA Li & THEo LUBKE, POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DE-
RIVATIVES MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 424 (2010),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff-reports/sr424.pdf.
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mandated use of central clearing counterparties for all secondary market
trades in put right hedging contracts. 2 9 7
C. "Creaming" (Version 2)
Another version of the creaming argument bemoans the additional
cost of law school financing that will result from the law school bearing
risk in the process. Under this version, critics may charge that the law
school will look to subsidize the cost of insuring against any potential
losses resulting from eventual put exercises by embedding the cost of the
insurance policy-or, dare we say, a credit default swap-into the tuition
of current students. This seems less an argument than an admission that
the current model fails to deliver value commensurate with its costs. For,
if the value proposition advertised by so many schools is believable,
there should be a real absence of put exercise, making the cost of insur-
ance negligible for all but the noneconomic institutions. For a school to
admit that the cost of insurance will substantially increase its budget is to
openly doubt its own value proposition. If a school doubts its own value
proposition, it might think about becoming an unschool; and we will all
be better off.2 9 8 Schools would also be afforded ample time to prepare
for the system proposed here, as any contingent liability would only be
realized after a substantial period of time (on the exercise date of the first
put right rolled out pursuant to this Article's proposal).
Does this proposal reduce all of the intangibles of a law school edu-
cation to a math equation? The answer to this charge is a resounding no;
and this proposal does not mean to assert anything close to the contrary.
297 See DuFFIE ET AL., supra note 296, at 1; TREASURY WHITEPAPER, supra note 296, at
81; see also Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency
and Reduce Risks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Securities, Insurance, and Investment of
the S. Comm. of Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 8 (June 22, 2009) (Testi-
mony of A. Patricia White, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Research and Statistics, Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/
white20090622a.htm (advocating the use of central counterparties for OTC products). But cf.
Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty
Risk? 3 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 46, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1348343 (arguing that the
fragmentation of clearing services erodes any benefits gained through the central clearing of
derivatives).
298 In fact, many are starting to understand that there might be an oversupply of lawyers.
See, e.g., NAT'L Assoc. OF LAW PLACEMENT, MARKET FOR LAW GRADUATES CHANGES WITH
RECESSION: CLASS OF 2009 FACED NEW CHALLENGES 3 (2010), available at http://www.
nalp.org/uploads/Class of_2009_SelectedFindings.pdf (noting that while the Class of 2009's
overall employment rate was better than that in the economy overall, "we can expect the Great
Recession" to continue to have an impact on the employment experiences of the classes that
will follow this one"); Greenbaum, supra note 67 (observing thousands of unemployed law-
yers and wondering whether the federal government should take steps to limit the number of
new lawyers in the face of the ABA's "repeated unwillingness to change to this changing
reality").
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Instead, this Article offers an alternative that rationalizes the allocation
of risk to those better prepared to shoulder it and better able to make the
necessary adjustments in response to observed outcomes. This model
offers only a structural alternative, and remains careful to steer clear of
any discussion of the intrinsic value of any particular curriculum or
pedagogy, a law student's individual circumstances, or a person's self-
worth. Simply allocating risk to those who are better prepared to shoul-
der it and better able to make necessary long-term adjustments based on
realized risks and designing a system by which that risk can be measured
says nothing about the intrinsic value of a curriculum, pedagogy, individ-
ual circumstances, or a person's self-worth. The point is that the market
forces introduced by this Article's proposal will compel law schools, in
delivering their pedagogical services, to offer value to students while si-
multaneously improving the availability of relevant information for pro-
spective law students.
The market resulting from the adoption of this Article's proposal
will be more Pareto efficient: forcing expensive lower-tier schools to ar-
ticulate a coherent value proposition or fade away. 299 No one should be
overly sympathetic to the plight of these schools; expensive, lower-tier
schools in their current form never represented a good deal for non-upper
income students to begin with. The point is that the market will dictate
that these schools either (i) lower their costs to match the expected in-
come of their students (and, therefore, lower the risk of the put being
exercised) or (ii) simply fail. Lower-tier expensive schools that do sur-
vive will likely be driven into a position as the playground of wealthy,
mediocre students.
The market itself is already signaling this type of stratification. The
bimodal distribution of starting graduate salaries practically screams for
a lower cost solution for those students landing in the left most mode of
the distribution.300 In addition, the increasing need for risky, unregulated
private loans signals that costs are outpacing even the efforts of the fed-
eral government to keep up with them.301 The point is that the law
schools in their current incarnation, with their insulation from the market
risks borne by their students, have not responded, and are not likely to
respond, to graduates' lower earnings prospects.
299 In economics, Pareto Optimality is achieved if (i) there is no way to make some indi-
vidual better off without making someone else worse off; (ii) there is no way to make everyone
better off; or (iii) it is not possible to make any trades that are mutually beneficial. See SpuRR,
supra note 167, at 60 (noting that, in general, efficiency is achieved when resources are allo-
cated to their use of highest value).
300 Again, there is ample evidence that the students falling in the left mode are also carry-
ing the greatest debt burden! See Henderson, Results or Resumes?, supra note 188, at 21.
301 See supra discussion at notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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The introduction of market forces to law school administrators
should slow non-optimal behavior that lessens the value of law school
educations for many students. In addition, another benefit of the market
proposed by this Article should ultimately be realized in the transparent,
value-centric information that it could provide for consumers of legal
education. Our proposal embraces the long-accepted notion of the supe-
riority of the price signal in aggregating information. 302 Whether an ad-
vocate or critic of the U.S. News rankings system, it cannot be said that
the U.S. News methodology addresses the question of whether a single
student at a particular school is able to find benefit from his post-gradua-
tion experience that outstrips the cost he paid for his degree. Instead of
choosing from a homogenous set of law schools based on the deeply-
flawed information provided by the U.S. News rankings, prospective stu-
dents would approach the market for legal education services armed with
a data set that closely measures the success of a law school's alumni, and
therefore puts a school's money where its mouth is in terms of the value
it delivers for its students.
D. Comparisons to Federal Income-Based Repayment Program
Some will undoubtedly question whether the plan described in these
pages is preferable to the ongoing efforts of the Obama Administration to
rationalize payments of borrowers based on their income.303 While those
attempts are admirable for the relief they might provide a group of ex-
isting borrowers already enticed into unmanageable debt positions, the
Income Based Repayment Program does nothing to address the ongoing
runaway tuition inflation this Article describes. Any long-term solution
to the problem must encourage better cost and value decisions by higher
education institutions with respect to proposed expenditures and must
discourage reflexive tuition increases by the higher education enterprise.
In short, the education enterprise must be encouraged to coordinate the
cost and price of its offering with the value that it offers its students. In
that regard, this Article's proposal, unlike the Obama Administration's
efforts, embodies the view that ex ante prevention, not ex post redistribu-
tion, remains the best medicine.
E. Issues Raised by the Real Possibility of Non-Income-Maximizing
Behavior by Graduates
The paradigm presented in this Article, like many economic models,
generally assumes that law school graduates will act in a profit-maximiz-
302 See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcON. REv. 519, 525
(1945) (describing the superiority of market choices to other alternatives as a reflection of
information).
303 See supra Part I.B.4.iii.
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ing fashion following their graduation. In essence, the model assumes
that all graduates will seek to maximize their incomes by taking the high-
est-paying jobs available at all times before the expiration of the put right
described in this Article. Such an assumption betrays a certain naivet6,
as experience suggests that students are likely to stray from such rigid
behavior for any number of reasons, including lifestyle and family plan-
ning goals. In addition, certain modern theories of behavioral economics
challenge the profit-maximizing assumption by arguing that, in many cir-
cumstances, people satisfice, by, for example, favoring a job that pays
well enough over one offering the greatest compensation. 304
Given the many non-profit maximizing nuances of real human be-
havior, some, especially law school administrators, will question the wis-
dom of shifting part of the monetary costs of voluntary non-profit
maximizing behavior by law school alumni to their respective law
schools via the put right described in this Article. Therefore, safeguards
must be designed to ensure that the system suggested here does not de-
volve into such an indemnity.
One possible form of such a safeguard would be to require all grad-
uates seeking to exercise their put right to make a good faith effort to
maximize professional income and to produce documentation and other
evidence of this good faith effort satisfactory to a representative of an
oversight agency. 305 However, a law school graduate with a put right
tied to her student loans should not necessarily be barred from seeking
employment that pays less but offers nonpecuniary rewards. In fact, in a
system with such a requirement, we would be hard-pressed to find the
next generation of law professors. 306 A more moderate and appropriate
solution would be a sliding scale, where non-profit-maximizing decisions
of a borrower following graduation might result in a partial or full termi-
nation of the put right (varying as a function of the type, degree, and time
frame of the non-profit maximizing behavior), an extension of its expira-
tion date, or a number of other adjustments that can be designed to fit
particular nuances of possible student behavior. Furthermore, to lighten
304 See, e.g., R.M. HOGARTH, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION
177-84 (1980); 3 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: EMPIRICALLY
GROUNDED ECONOMIC REASON 291-98 (1997); Robert Bordley, Reformulating Decision The-
ory Using Fuzzy Set Theory and Shafer's Theory of Evidence, Fuzzy SETS & SYSTEMs, 139,
243-266 (2003); Robert Bordley, & Marco LiCalzi, Decision Analysis Using Targets Instead
of Utility Functions, 23 DECISIONS IN ECON. & FIN. 53 (May 2000).
305 Such a good faith standard is typical of state unemployment benefit extension rules,
which often require documentation and other evidence of adequate job search activities to be
produced prior to approvals for extensions of unemployment benefits. See, e.g., Extensions &
FAQs: Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.labor.state.ny.
us/ui/claimantinfo/eucfaqs.shtm#5 (last visited Aug. 22, 2010) (describing New York state's
requirements for a twenty-week extension of unemployment benefits).
306 But c.f supra Part I.B.3.
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administrative costs, the sliding scale could incorporate certain thresh-
olds where, for example, a certain amount of non-income-maximizing
behavior would not require any modifications to the put right. Finally, in
a system that requires the borrower to relinquish the law degree in con-
nection with a put exercise, much of the discussion surrounding the
noneconomic decision-making of borrowers changes dramatically. 307
F. Encouraging Debt for Those Able to Pay in Cash
One of the most unfortunate distortions of the model proposed
herein is that it might encourage students otherwise able to pay their law
school bill without financing into a position of assuming debt to take
advantage of the risk shifting that the model proposes. Under such a
scenario, students able to pay their full way through school might none-
theless be attracted to the subsidy offered by the put right accompanying
a borrowing. Such a distortion is particularly unappealing for those of us
who believe a lack of respect of, and hesitation for, debt encumbrance
lies at the root of many of our nation's current economic problems.
There are adjustments that can be made to discourage such behavior, but
the Article's authors do not consider this a substantial enough risk to
address it at any length here.
CONCLUSION
Because "good times breed laxity and . .. a dangerous environment
calls for the very best of responses," 308 this Article arises in the service
of circumstance. It is high time for all stakeholders in the higher educa-
tion game to embrace the concept of value. The higher education model
that has educated generations of America's best, delivered incomparable
achievement, solidified unsurpassed scientific and technological ad-
vancement, and improved the social standing of its students, requires a
fundamental reexamination. This Article's proposal addresses the exter-
nal forces that have allowed the current model to grow unresponsive to
customer needs and unsustainable for all stakeholders.
Focusing for the sake of brevity on the legal segment of the higher
education market, the Article embraces what one commentator called a
"less academic and more market-driven model of legal education"
3 -
that is, a more rational model where risks and costs are more transparent,
more easily measured, and borne by the appropriate parties. While by no
means an exhaustive, final solution to all that ails higher education, pro-
viding student borrowers with a put right would represent a significant
307 See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
308 Frank J. Macchiarola, What Are We Doing and What More Has to Be Done?, 71 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 531, 532 (1994).
309 Schwarzschild, supra note 11, at 10.
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step in the right direction. At the very least, this Article stands for the
notion that any answers to the economics that threaten the future of legal
education would begin with greater fidelity to the consumer's interest
and would "surely involve legal academics facing up to various uncom-
fortable truths about the way we live now." 310
For the legal academy, no goal is more important than ensuring that
the ability to educate and train fine lawyers endures. In short, "[T]he law
is what the lawyers are. And the law and the lawyers are what the law
schools make them."31'
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310 Paul Campos, Shame 15, 23 (Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-033, 2008), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=l 161241 (depicting several fictional
"legal academic characters" and their foibles).
311 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Mr. Rosenwald 3
(May 13, 1927) (Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library), quoted in RAND
JACK & DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VAL-
UES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 156 (1989).
312 See NALP, How Did We Get Here?, supra note 190.
OPTIoNs FOR STUDENT BORROWERS 135


















3. DISTRIBUTION OF FULL-TIME SALARIES, CLASS OF 2000314
,000 30,000 50,000 70,000 90,000 110,000 130,000 150,000 170,000 190,000 210,000
2010]
- Median = $52,000
313 See id.
314 See id.
136 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:67
















FIGURE 5. AVERAGE AMOUNT BORROWED FOR LAW SCHOOL
2001-2008316








FIGURE 6. CHANGE OVER TIME IN MEDIAN LAW SCHOOL TUITION 31 7
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
Median Public Law School $1,792 $3,012 $4,897 $7,201 $12,107 $15,621
Tuition (Resident)
Median Public Law School $4,786 $7,390 $11,656 $16,113 $23,506 $26,436
Tuition (Non-Resident)
Median Private Law School $7,385 $11,680 $16,930 $21,920 $28,670 $33,985
Tuition
315 See id.
316 See ABA, Average Amount Borrowed, supra note 34, at 1.
317 See Law School Tuition 1985-2008, supra note 31, at 1-3.
- Median = $62,000
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FIGURE 7. CHANGE OVER TIME IN MEAN LAW SCHOOL TUITION3 1 8
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
Mean Public Law School Tuition $2,006 $3,236 $5,530 $7,790 $13,145 $16,836
(Resident)
Mean Public Law School Tuition $4,724 $7,365 $11,683 $15,683 $22,987 $28,442
(Non-Resident)
Mean Private Law School Tuition $7,526 $11,728 $16,798 $21,790 $28,900 $34,298
FIGURE 8. AVERAGE LIVING AND BOOK EXPENSES FOR SINGLE






















319 See Average Living and Book Expenses for Single Students Living on Campus
1990-2008, AM. B. Ass'N, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/stats.html (follow
"Average Living and Book Expenses for Single Students Living on Campus" hyperlink) (last
visited Sept. 30, 2010).
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FIGURE 9. FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN STATISTICS, 2008320
New Loans New Loan Volume Average Loan
Program (millions) ($, billions) Size ($)
Stafford Subsidized 7.9 30.4 3,945
Stafford Unsubsidized 7.5 32.7 4,544
PLUS Loans 1.1 11.4 11,114
Consolidated Loans 5.0 14.8 30,206
Perkins Loans 0.7 1.1 2,231
320 See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FIscAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND
INFORMATION 60 (2010), available at U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/
overview/budgetlbudgetlO/summary/l0summary.pdf (providing information for Perkins
Loans); Student Loan Tables, Number of Loans (in Thousands), U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://
www2.ed.gov/aboutloverview/budget/studentloantables/1Oappendixtables/apploantables.pdf
(providing information for Stafford Subsidized, Stafford Unsubsidized, PLUS, and
Consolidated Loans).
